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3 
Glossary of Acronyms and Terms 
 
 
ACA Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act  
AFP Americans for Prosperity, a conservative advocacy group known best 
for advancing the causes of the Tea Party, also works to disrupt the 
implementation of the ACA, especially Medicaid expansion. AFP is 
primarily backed by the Koch brothers, and is an increasingly 
influential power in state politics. Played a role in obstructing 
expansion in Tennessee. 
CMS Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, federal agency for 
oversight of Medicare and Medicaid.  
FMAP Federal Medical Assistance Percentage: the portion of funding paid by 
the federal government to cover the costs of the newly eligible 
population.  
 
If a state chooses to expand, the federal government pays for the 
following share of the newly eligible population: 
2014-2016: 100% of costs covered by federal gov’t 
2017: 95% 
2018: 94% 
2019: 93% 
            2020-beyond: 90% 
FPL Federal Poverty Level  
Managed Care 
Organizations 
(MCOs) 
Managed care plans broadly refer to different types of health 
insurance. These plans serve as mediators between care providers and 
the patient. There are three types of managed care plans: Health 
Maintenance Organizations (HMO), Preferred Provider Organizations 
(PPO), and Point of Service (POS). 
Medicaid 
 
Social welfare program established during President Lyndon B. 
Johnson’s Great Society. Provides government-funded healthcare to 
low-income individuals. The program is funded at the federal and 
state levels but is state administered. 
Medicaid coverage 
gap 
The population excluded from Medicaid because their income is too 
high to qualify Medicaid but not high enough to qualify for federal 
subsidies for private insurance.1 
NCSL National Conference on State Legislatures 
NFIB or NFIB vs. 
Sebelius 
National Federation of Independent Business vs. Sebelius: Supreme 
Court case decided on June 28, 2012. The court upheld the 
constitutionality of the ACA, but felt that a federal mandate for states 
to expand Medicaid up to 138% was a federal overreach. Thus, states 
are able to opt out of Medicaid expansion.  
OHT Ohio’s Office of Health Transformation 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Samantha Artiga, Anthony Damico, and Rachel Garfield, “The Impact of the Coverage Gap for Adults in States 
not Expanding Medicaid by Race and Ethnicity,” Kaiser Family Foundation, October 26, 2015.  
4 
SCI State Coverage Initiative. Former Ohio Governor Ted Strickland 
created this body to advise on healthcare administration. 
State of the State  Governors deliver these speeches every year. They usually run 
through each state agency’s annual highlights/accomplishments. Also 
gives the governor a chance to comment on current local events. 
TennCare Tennessee’s state Medicaid program.  
Uncompensated 
Care 
Refers to health care provided that is never paid for by the patient or 
the insurer. Usually, individuals without insurance incur this care. 
Hospitals are legally required to admit Medicaid patients but have no 
guarantee that those services will be covered. Uncompensated care 
cuts into hospitals’ revenue and growth prospects.2  
Woodwork 
Phenomenon  
Federal fund matching program does not account for individuals who 
had always been eligible for Medicaid but had not signed up for the 
program, and because of increased attention on health insurance, 
decide to sign up. States are responsible for covering those 
individual’s health coverage, which is an additional fiscal burden for 
the state. The federal government will only pay for the care of the 
newly eligible group.3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Healthcare.gov, “Glossary.” 
3 Benjamin Sommers and Arnold Epstein, “Why States Are So Miffed About Medicaid—Economics, Politics, and 
the ‘Woodwork Effect,’” New England Journal of Medicine, July 14, 2011, Page 100-102.  
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Abstract 
 The June 2012 Supreme Court ruling in NFIB vs. Sebelius, which made the Affordable 
Care Act’s (ACA) Medicaid expansion optional, granted fifty individual state governments 
unprecedented discretion in the ACA’s implementation. As states adopt or reject expansion, the 
overall pattern of Medicaid expansion can be explained by one of three explanations: state 
political ideology, partisan control of the state legislature, or economic need. However, there are 
a handful of anomalous states that pursued expansion in spite of being ideologically conservative 
and controlled by Republican lawmakers. This paper describes Republican governors’ frames of 
Medicaid expansion in three such cases: Arizona and Ohio, where governors saw expansion 
through, and Tennessee, where expansion has not succeeded. After presenting the Medicaid 
narrative in each state, this paper will consider the impact of framing as a contributor to the 
political cascade that produces expansion. Ultimately, framing proves to be a moderate 
contributor to expansion, but in some instances, may have accelerated parts of the expansion 
process and shaped the public discourse around the policy. Medicaid expansion frames are 
important for the future of the policy, in terms of how easily it can be altered or undone.  
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Introduction 
America’s Healthcare Landscape 
Our presence here today is remarkable and improbable.  With all the punditry, all of the 
lobbying, all of the game-playing that passes for governing in Washington, it’s been easy at 
times to doubt our ability to do such a big thing, such a complicated thing; to wonder if there are 
limits to what we, as a people, can still achieve.  It’s easy to succumb to the sense of cynicism 
about what’s possible in this country. 
But today, we are affirming that essential truth -– a truth every generation is called to rediscover 
for itself –- that we are not a nation that scales back its aspirations.  We are not a nation that 
falls prey to doubt or mistrust.  We don't fall prey to fear.  We are not a nation that does what’s 
easy.  That’s not who we are.  That’s not how we got here. 
We are a nation that faces its challenges and accepts its responsibilities.  We are a nation that 
does what is hard.  What is necessary.  What is right.  Here, in this country, we shape our own 
destiny.  That is what we do.  That is who we are.  That is what makes us the United States of 
America.  
And we have now just enshrined, as soon as I sign this bill, the core principle that everybody 
should have some basic security when it comes to their health care. And it is an extraordinary 
achievement that has happened because of all of you and all the advocates all across the 
country. 
     —President Barack Obama, March 23, 2010 
 
 Under exceptional political circumstances—a huge federal deficit, Congressional tension, 
and a demoralizing economic recession—the Obama administration introduced one of the largest 
social benefit bills since Social Security and Medicare. The Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act (ACA) is considered Obama’s landmark policy.  The bill attempts to improve the 
quality of health care services, mitigate barriers to care, and alter the nature of healthcare 
8 
substantively.  The ACA’s goals include universal coverage, state-led health infrastructure 
innovation, and a shift from fee-for-service to managed care systems.4  
 The ACA did not roll out without challenges from multiple stakeholder levels, most 
notably from the Supreme Court. A major 2012 Supreme Court case, National Federation of 
Independent Business (NFIB) vs. Sebelius, upheld the constitutionality of most provisions in the 
ACA. But the justices agreed that the Medicaid expansion mandate, a major tenet of the ACA, 
was unconstitutionally coercive, and gave state governments the choice to opt out of expansion. 
The ACA intended to ensure that everyone—regardless of health status or income—had some 
kind of health care, but the court’s ruling on expansion threatened that promise.  
 The federal government and states jointly fund Medicaid, but states design and 
administer the program on their own. Medicaid provides health care coverage to a sector of 
children, elderly adults, people with disabilities, and low-income adults. Prior to the ACA, states 
were required to provide insurance for certain low-income or dependent populations or they 
would lose federal funding for Medicaid.5 The ACA does not change this statute; but it expanded 
eligibility requirements to include adults earning up to 138% of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL), 
which was about $16,000 per year for an individual in 2015.6 Much of the controversy regarding 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 These goals are achieved by the following mechanisms. The individual mandate is a new requirement for all 
individuals to obtain health insurance, or pay an incrementally increasing fine for going without.  Guaranteed issue 
refers to a practice in which insurance companies offer individuals health insurance regardless of their health status 
(i.e. pre-existing conditions). Managed care plans broadly refer to different types of health insurance. These plans 
serve as mediators between care providers and the patient. There are three types of managed care plans: Health 
Maintenance Organizations (HMO), Preferred Provider Organizations (PPO), and Point of Service (POS). 
5 Larry Jacobs and Theda Skocpol, Health Care Reform and American Politics: What Everyone Needs To Know 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
6 Vikki Wachino, Samantha Artiga, and Robin Rudowitz, “How is the ACA Impacting Medicaid Enrollment?” 
Kaiser Family Foundation, May 5, 2014. 
 
“How the Census Bureau Measures Poverty,” US Census Bureau website.  
The Census Bureau determines the poverty line based on income. The cutoff varies by family structure and 
size. The Federal Poverty Line is computed with an algorithm that takes into account earnings (Social 
Security, pensions, unemployment compensation included); it excludes noncash benefits like food stamps 
and capital gains. This threshold is indexed to inflation annually, based on the Consumer Price Index.  
9 
Medicaid stemmed from its fiscal burden—Medicaid is often the largest line item in a state’s 
budget—and the debate about whether welfare should be expanded. The ACA Medicaid 
expansion is separate from existing Medicaid. Under the new ACA provisions, the federal 
government assumes 100% of Medicaid expansion costs through 2017; federal funding gradually 
drops to 90% in 2020 and beyond.7 Now that Medicaid expansion is up to the discretion of 
governors, the “Medicaid coverage gap,” in which individuals earn too much to qualify for 
Medicaid and earn too little to qualify for federal subsidies for private insurance, persists. ACA 
reforms were designed to provide subsidies for private insurance above a certain income bracket, 
assuming that states would enroll the remaining low-income individuals for Medicaid. The 
Medicaid gap undermines the original intention of the ACA to provide insurance coverage to all 
Americans. As of March 2016, 32 states including Washington D.C. have expanded the 
program.8  
 The complexity of Medicaid extends beyond its funding structure. States can individually 
decide the income threshold to qualify for benefits, and those cutoffs vary dramatically. In 
Maryland, for example, parents and childless adults earning up to 133% FPL are eligible for 
Medicaid; across the Potomac River in Virginia, parents are only eligible up to 49% FPL, and 
childless adults cannot qualify for Medicaid.9 States can also apply for a number of Section 1115 
Waivers, which allow for greater program flexibility in terms of premium subsidies, beneficiary 
rewards for practicing “healthy behaviors,” work requirements, time limits on eligibility and 
more.10 There is high variability among states’ Medicaid programs. Given the level of detail and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 See Glossary, “FMAP.” 
8 “Current Status of State Medicaid Expansion Decisions,” Kaiser Family Foundation, March 14, 2016. 
9 “State Medicaid and CHIP Income Eligibility Standards,” Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. 
10 Robin Rudowitz and MaryBeth Musumeci, “The ACA and Medicaid Expansion Waivers,” Kaiser Family 
Foundation, November 20, 2015.  
10 
range of options for Medicaid, voters are unlikely to be able to come to their own conclusions 
about their preferences for the program.  
 Given this brief description of recent healthcare reforms, the remaining chapters will 
delve into the politics of Medicaid expansion. Chapter 1 will describe existing but inadequate 
structural explanations for Medicaid expansion in the literature and raise the possibility that elite 
framing may help explain anomalous cases. Chapter 2 will outline my research methodology, 
including how I propose to assess the importance of framing in Medicaid expansion debates. 
Chapters 3, 4, and 5 describe Medicaid expansion politics in Ohio, Tennessee, and Arizona, 
respectively. In chapter 6, I compare framing strategies across the cases and contextualize 
framing in the state policymaking process. Finally, chapter 7 offers a conclusion of the research 
and a discussion of the broader implications of my research.  
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Chapter 1 
Why Do Some, But Not All, States Expand Medicaid? 
 
 This chapter reviews the relevant literature for my question. The first section summarizes 
the literature on Medicaid expansion outcomes. The second portion of this chapter discusses the 
literature on framing. This culminates in my research question. There are three overarching 
bodies of research that explain Medicaid expansion since the passage of the ACA. This academic 
research employs both conventional and innovative political mechanisms to determine a pattern 
of Medicaid expansion in American states. These explanations can be divided into three themes: 
party control of the legislature, political ideology, and economic need.  
 First, research hypothesizes that party control over any given legislative body—Senate, 
House, or governorship—can indicate the likelihood of Medicaid expansion. States with 
Democrats controlling the House, Senate, and governorship tend to be more likely to expand 
Medicaid than states that have Republican control over a legislative body.11 Democratic states 
are more likely to expand Medicaid because they are generally more generous with social 
welfare programs.12 This explanation assumes that party members are partisan, meaning that they 
will adhere to party preferences and will be unwilling to negotiate with members of the opposite 
party.13  
 The second body of literature explores how the political ideology of states might 
determine the outcome of expansion. Political ideology refers to the set of guiding beliefs and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Timothy Callaghan and Lawrence R. Jacobs, “Process learning and the implementation of Medicaid reform,” 
Publius: The Journal of Federalism, Vol.44 (4), 2014, Page 541-563. 
12 Callaghan and Jacobs, “Process learning and the implementation of Medicaid reform,” Page 542. 
13 Elizabeth Rigby and Jake Haselswerdt, “Hybrid federalism, partisan politics, and early implementations of the 
state health insurance exchanges,” Publius: The Journal of Federalism, Vol. 43 (3), 2013, Page 370. 
12 
values of the two dominant political parties in the U.S.—the Democrats and the Republicans.14 
Thus, we would expect states that embody the Democrats’ platform to vote in favor of expansion 
and states that favor Republican values to oppose it. There is a nuanced distinction between 
partisanship—the previous explanation—and ideology. While partisanship refers to individuals 
who must choose to adhere to political principles, ideology tends to direct the macro way a 
society should progress, in terms of whether it is organized in a liberal or socialist manner. State 
political ideology can be influenced by geographic region, economic activity, or ethnic diversity. 
Political ideology might govern the way policies are introduced in a state, but political 
partisanship might govern how politicians vote or lobby their constituents. 
 The third group of scholarship seeks to explain Medicaid adoption by state economic 
need. The National Association of State Budget Officers (NASBO) estimated that 23.6% of state 
expenditures was devoted to Medicaid in fiscal year 2011. With Medicaid occupying such a 
significant portion of any given state’s budget, governors must carefully balance cost control of 
healthcare and budgetary prudence.  Examining the economic pressures for states in the post-
ACA landscape reveals a major motivation for political action: money. 
 
Party Control  
 One predominant explanation in the literature is that the composition of a given state’s 
legislature determines the likelihood of Medicaid expansion. This argument is grounded in the 
idea that majorities in the House and Senate behave predictably. Thus, we would expect states 
with Republican-controlled legislative bodies to reject expansion bills and Democratic-controlled 
bodies to support expansion bills. The more partisan, the more likely a politician will cling to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 David O. Sears, Richard R. Lau, Tom R. Tyler, and Harris M. Allen Jr., “Self-Interest vs. Symbolic Politics in 
Policy Attitudes and Presidential Voting,” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 74 (3), 1980, Page 670-684. 
13 
party lines. If political partisanship explained Medicaid expansion decisions, Republican-
controlled states should reject the expansion, which the evidence does not uniformly support. 
States like Arizona, Ohio, Arkansas, and Michigan were controlled by Republicans, but still 
opted to expand Medicaid.  
 Jacobs and Callaghan find a strong correlation between party control and Medicaid 
expansion. They confirm the expected pattern of Democratic Party-controlled states “moving 
fastest and farthest” towards expansion and Republican Party-controlled states slowly 
progressing or remaining generally inactive.15 The study used an additive measure of each state’s 
legislative progression on expansion to determine how influential party control was. Points were 
awarded based on whether states embraced expanded benefits or a streamlined payment system, 
among other new program initiatives. This measure was cumulative and summarized lawmaker 
“activity at a point of flux.” For the most part, the distribution of Medicaid implementation 
reflected partisan control. Republican control corresponded with inaction or little action, while 
states controlled by Democrats were actively pursuing expansion.16 But for states with split 
control within the legislature, or with divided government between the legislature and governor, 
legislative initiative on Medicaid is not attributable to party control. Jacobs and Callaghan 
address this deficiency in their article; they also consider economic strain on states and a state’s 
history of Medicaid policy as possible explanations for progress on expansion.  
 Similar to Jacobs and Callaghan, Rigby and Haselswerdt hypothesized that after 
controlling for ideological agreement with the ACA, Democrat-controlled states were more 
likely to establish state exchanges for insurance. Insurance exchanges were similar to Medicaid 
expansion in that the empirical basis of the program should have appealed to all states, but 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Larry Jacobs and Timothy Callaghan, “Why States Expand Medicaid: Party, Resources, and History,” Journal of 
Health Politics, Policy and Law, Vol. 38 (5), October 2013, Page 1032.  
16 Ibid., Pages 1028, 1029, 1032.  
14 
partisan posturing often obstructed implementation. Republicans, who unanimously opposed the 
ACA, did not want to reverse course and implement an ACA tenet. Rigby and Haselswerdt’s 
research found that partisanship is a “prominent” explanation for the establishment of healthcare 
exchanges. Democratic governors pushed forward in conservative states, while Republican 
leaders blocked bills in liberal states. The authors also found that the party affiliation of elected 
insurance commissioners influenced whether or not the state adopted the health exchange.17  
Thus, legislative composition and connotations of party preference seemed to supersede the 
substance of the health reforms. This school of thought has a key limitation. Most research sorts 
party identity into two or three categories—Democrat, Republican, or other. That grouping 
ignores some of the nuance within “purple” or swing states, which is where the most anomalous 
Medicaid policy occurs. 
 
Political Ideology  
 Political ideology is one of the most pervasive influences in policymaking and health 
policy is no exception.18 Since Medicaid’s creation in 1965 under Lyndon B. Johnson’s Great 
Society, political party and preferences regarding healthcare grew increasingly intertwined. The 
two major political parties in the U.S. polarized on their positions about the provision of social 
services, including healthcare. The Democratic Party states in its platform that healthcare is a 
core component of its value system as it offers “economic security” and contributes to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Rigby and Haselswerdt, “Hybrid federalism, partisan politics, and early implementations of the state health 
insurance exchanges,” Pages 377 and 387. 
18 Nolan McCarty, Keith Poole, and Howard Rosenthal, Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal 
Riches, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008.) 
 
John Aldrich and James Coleman Battista, “Conditional Party Government in the States,” The American 
Journal of Political Science, Vol. 46 (1), 2002, Page 164–172. 
15 
prosperity of the middle class.19 The Republican Party groups healthcare with other welfare 
“handouts” that dis-incentivize un-or-underemployed Americans from optimizing their labor 
potential. In order to satisfy their values of limited government intervention and greater 
individual choice, the Republican Party prefers stricter eligibility requirements for public health 
insurance programs.20  
 In 2010, the Democratic Party controlled the national Senate, House, and White House, 
advantaging legislation that would otherwise be subjected to the rigorous policymaking process. 
This enabled President Obama to squeeze through some of the biggest social policy reforms 
since the 1960’s. The ACA did not get a single vote of support from Republicans in Congress; 
most Democrats supported it. Since the ACA was never bipartisan, we would expect party 
control at the state level to mirror that divide in terms of implementation of the ACA’s optional 
provisions.  
 The seminal works in this school of thought generally follow a pattern of identifying 
policy proposals where one party acts against its fundamental goals or values. Grogan and Rigby 
explore ideological conflict in the implementation of another controversial healthcare program, 
the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP). When Democrat Ted Kennedy and 
Republican Orrin Hatch initially endorsed SCHIP, the program was hailed as successful 
collaboration between Democrats and Republicans. Yet ten years later, when the federal 
government went through the legislative reauthorization process to renew the policy, 
Republicans pushed for narrowing eligibility requirements while Democrats supported broader 
requirements.21 What accounted for this transition from cooperation to collapse? The researchers 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Democratic Party Platform, 2012. 
20 Republican Party Platform, 2012. 
21 Colleen Grogan and Elizabeth Rigby, “Federalism, partisan politics, and shifting support for state flexibility: The 
case of the U.S. State Children’s Health Insurance Program,” Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 2009, Page 1.  
16 
concluded that ideological polarization heightened the national debate surrounding SCHIP 
renewal and contributed to the widening gap in politicians’ preferences. In order to support their 
assertion, Grogan and Rigby examined the fifty states’ program design of SCHIP, looking at 
variables like eligibility limits, cost of living index, and percentage of minority residents to 
understand the historical and current support for SCHIP in each state. The authors concluded that 
the SCHIP controversy and slow re-approval process was a result of intensifying ideological 
distance, which clouded previous federal-level consensus.22   
 Jones, Bradley, and Oberlander concurred with Grogan’s assertion about the importance 
of ideology in understanding policies that initially had bipartisan support. Jones et. al. studied 
opposition to state-run health insurance exchanges, another important tenet of the ACA. 
Republicans were expected to embrace this component of the ACA because states would be 
given significant autonomy to design the marketplaces. Conservative ideology tends to favor 
federalism and states rights, and insurance exchanges were a huge administrative handoff from 
the federal government to the states. Why, then, did only a quarter of states implement this 
initially bipartisan policy? Jones and his collaborators concluded that other ideological 
constraints contributed to many Republican governors deciding to return control of exchanges to 
Washington.23  These constraints include not wanting to be seen as supporting President Obama, 
hoping that the ACA would be reversed, or preferring to rely on the federal government to 
oversee this program because it would require too many state resources. These decisions 
ultimately gave the federal government more control over the exchanges, a practice that 
Republicans typically oppose. If ideology determined all expansion outcomes, then states with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Grogan and Rigby, “Federalism, partisan politics, and shifting support for state flexibility: The case of the U.S. 
State Children’s Health Insurance Program,” Pages 8 and 17.  
23 David K. Jones, Katharine Bradley, and Jonathan Oberlander, “Pascal’s wager: Health insurance exchanges, 
Obamacare, and the Republican dilemma,” Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, Vol. 39 (1), 2014, Pages 129 
and 130.  
17 
GOP roots would not even consider the policy. Some, but not all, evidence supports this 
conjecture.  
 
Economic Need 
 The third predominant explanation of Medicaid expansion is economic. The Obama 
administration conceived a federal fund-matching scheme to pay for individuals who would join 
Medicaid when the eligibility requirements were expanded. The federal government covers 
100% of the cost of expansion for the first three years—from 2014 through 2016—and continues 
to cover no less than 90% of costs for newly insured individuals from 2020 onwards.24 
Conventional economic thinking hypothesizes that less well-off states, facing tight budgets in the 
wake of the 2008 financial crisis and rising expenditures on education and healthcare, would be 
more inclined to engage with the federal fund matching formula and opt to expand.25 Existing 
research confirms that the less affluent a state is, the more impactful fiscal incentives are in 
affecting policy change.26   
 The equation laid out by the Obama administration is a strong fiscal incentive for poorer 
states; that logic would predict that the poorer a state, the higher the likelihood of increasing 
Medicaid eligibility requirements.27 Jacobs and Callaghan tested this prediction by using per 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 “State Health Care Spending on Medicaid: A 50-state study of trends and drivers of cost,” The Pew Charitable 
Trust, July 2014.  
25 Jacobs and Callaghan, “Why States Expand Medicaid: Party, Resources, and History,” Page 1033. 
26 Ae-sook Kim and Edward Jennings, “The Evolution of an Innovation: Variations in Medicaid Managed Care 
Program Extensiveness,’’ Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, Vol. 37 (5), 2012, Page 815-849. 
 
Sean Nicholson-Crotty, “Leaving money on the table: Learning from recent refusals of 
Federal grants in the American states,” Publius: The Journal of Federalism, Vol. 42 (3), 2012, Page 449-
466. 
 
27 Kim and Jennings, “The Evolution of an Innovation,” Page 815-849. 
 
Stan Dorn, John Holahan, Caitlin Carroll, and Megan McGrath, “Medicaid Expansion Under the ACA: 
How States Analyze the Fiscal and Economic Trade-Offs,” The Urban Institute, June 2013.   
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capita state income to measure a state’s economic environment and level of need for additional 
funds. They found evidence that economic need might not drive state decisions on Medicaid 
reform in a need-based pattern as explained above. Rather, states with high per capita income, 
like Connecticut and Massachusetts, have moved farther along on the continuum of Medicaid 
expansion than states with low per capita incomes like Mississippi. Despite a state’s fiscal 
limitations, the low hanging fruit of federal funds may not be a decisive factor in the likelihood 
of expansion.28   
 Kim and Jennings echoed Jacobs and Callaghan’s assertion about the importance of 
economics but diverge in results. Kim and Jennings concluded that a state’s economic climate is 
the most determinative factor for the development of a Medicaid program. Kim and Jennings 
found statistical significance in variables like state’s wealth as measured by gross state product 
per capita; this conclusion led them to suggest that wealthier states have more disposable 
resources and thus less pressure to control Medicaid costs.29  This research supported the 
hypothesis that economic need predicts expansion outcomes.  
 In a study that pre-dates the ACA, Buchanan, Cappelleri, and Ohsfeldt concluded that 
economic factors such as voter per capita income had the greatest influence on Medicaid 
expenditure. The researchers identified independent variables such as personal per capita 
income, number of Medicaid recipients, previous years’ Medicaid expenditures, and physician 
density in order to establish correlations with Medicaid spending. First, the article described 
states’ social environments. Based on statistical regressions, data suggests that economic factors, 
rather than political factors, influenced spending. A key finding—that wealthier states tended to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Jacobs and Callaghan, “Why States Expand Medicaid: Party, Resources, and History,” Page 1035. 
29 Ae-sook Kim and Edward Jennings, “The Evolution of an Innovation,” Page 839. 
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spend more on Medicaid than their poorer counterparts—is consistent with data in the post-ACA 
landscape.30  
 Although each of these bodies of research offers valuable insights for explaining 
Medicaid expansion, there are still state narratives that cannot be explained by control of state 
legislature, political ideology, or economic need. Another possible contributing explanation is 
that the way governors of Republican states frame Medicaid expansion to their constituents via 
speeches or media influences Medicaid expansion politics.  
 Beyond the fact that these three explanations are not empirically satisfactory, these 
explanations only point to the structural determinants of the politics of expansion. They do not 
provide room for arguments surrounding individual agency. Politicians can increase or decrease 
the likelihood of policy passage by talking about issues. There is the possibility that skillful 
policy entrepreneurs, like governors, might determine what policies succeed, more so than 
ideology or political party control. Studying framing highlights the role of individual capacity in 
expansion outcomes.   
 The second portion of the literature discusses framing as political tool. Framing is a 
multi-disciplinary concept that is intended to help illuminate how issues are narrated affects 
individuals’ attitudes and preferences. Through framing, a communicator highlights one 
understanding of “the essence of the problem, suggest[s] how it should be thought about, and 
may go so far as to recommend what (if anything) should be done.”31   
 For political purposes, the power of framing lies in its ability to synthesize complex 
policies that the average voter is unable to parse through and highlight two or three key themes, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Robert Buchanan, Joseph Cappelleri and Robert Ohsfeldt, “The social environment and Medicaid expenditures: 
Factors influencing the level of state Medicaid spending,” Public Administration Review, Vol. 51 (1), 1991, Pages 
67-73.  
31 Thomas Nelson, Rosalee A. Clawson, and Zoe M. Oxley, “Media Framing of a Civil Liberties Conflict and its 
Effect on Tolerance,” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 91 (3), 1997, Page 567. 
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which then guide the individual’s full understanding of an issue.32 Many scholars apply framing 
as a political mechanism to help explain a myriad of political outcomes. In 2012, Tesler found 
that when the ACA healthcare reforms were associated with President Obama, support for the 
policy was significantly racialized as compared to when the policy was attributed to Bill 
Clinton’s efforts in 1993. Latent preferences about race and religion among the public were 
activated when the first black President proposed the sweeping ACA. The support gap between 
black and white Americans nearly doubled—in 1993, 69% of blacks and 43% of whites 
supported healthcare reform, while in 2010, 83% of blacks and 38% of whites were in support. 
The racialization of healthcare policy, when the policy itself was for all intents and purposes 
consistent, demonstrated how framing altered public perception and support.33   
 For my research purposes, framing will be defined as: how the way governors discuss 
Medicaid expansion more broadly influences public perception about expansion policy. 
Expansion frames can alter public support for the policy. In order to satisfy their constituents, 
state legislators will align with voter preference, which could alter the outcome of Medicaid 
expansion.   
 Framing effects are also well illustrated in Nelson et. al.’s experiment about tolerance for 
the Ku Klux Klan. The aggregate results showed that participants were more likely to tolerate a 
KKK rally if the issue were framed as a free speech issue as opposed to a public safety issue. 
These frames were brought into being through language, emphasis, and imagery. Nelson et. al.’s 
findings were not broken down by respondents’ race.34  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Nelson et. al., “Media Framing of a Civil Liberties Conflict and its Effect on Tolerance,” Page 568.  
33 Michael Tesler, “The spillover of racialization into health care: How President Obama polarized public opinion by 
racial attitudes and race,” The American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 56 (3), 2012, Pages 690-704, 692, and 
701. 
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 There are, of course, numerous limits to framing. Hopkins investigated how American 
public opinion was not discernably different before and after strategic frames about the ACA, 
like “government takeover” or “death panels,” were publicized. By identifying individual 
words—which ranged from “affordable” to “healthcare” to “pre-existing condition”—Hopkins 
tracked changes in the way the public searched for or used language about the ACA. He found 
that the public did not seem to directly respond to certain appeals the way politicians might have 
hoped.35   
 These two broad fields of scholarship—explanations for Medicaid expansion and 
framing—informed my research question. The existing explanations for expansion are 
inadequate, as they have not considered the role of an individual in determining outcomes. The 
effects of framing in the literature are incomplete because most literature relies on experiments. 
My research will address a deficiency in each body of work: I will study governors as agents in 
Medicaid expansion politics by describing their framing strategies and the practical challenges 
that informed those frames. Studying the framing of Medicaid expansion is worthwhile because 
of the policy’s complexity and multi-faceted nature.  
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Chapter 2 
Examining the Role of Framing in Unusual Medicaid Expansions 
 
Methodology 
 In order to research the role of framing in surprising instances of Medicaid expansion, I 
used a qualitative, case-study methodology. The case study method was best suited for me to 
provide a comprehensive and micro-level account of Medicaid expansion politics.36  I used one 
case study strategy to examine anomalous or deviant cases that have outcomes not supported by 
the literature. This approach, according to Gerring, is exploratory and hypothesis generating.37 In 
order to identify idiosyncratic or deviant cases, I organized the fifty states by expansion outcome 
and party control. Below is a chart of mispredicted states, unexplained by politics or ideology, 
from which I selected my cases:  
State Medicaid Expansion Outcome Party Control (2013) 
Arizona* Expanded Republican 
Arkansas Expanded Divided 
Indiana Expanded Republican 
Iowa Expanded Divided 
Kentucky Expanded Divided 
Louisiana Expanded Republican 
Maine Did not expand Divided 
Michigan Expanded Republican 
Missouri Did not expand Divided 
Nevada Expanded Divided 
New Hampshire Expanded Divided 
New Jersey Expanded Divided 
New Mexico Expanded Divided 
North Dakota Expanded Republican 
Ohio* Expanded Republican 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative 
Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994.)  
37 John Gerring, Case Study Research: Principles and Practices (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 
Pages 89 and 107. 
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Pennsylvania Expanded Republican 
Tennessee* Did not expand Republican 
            38 
 I selected three states—Ohio, Tennessee, and Arizona—as my cases from a pool of 
unexpected expansion states with particularly treacherous or complex expansion politics. These 
cases fell into the set of states least likely to expand, according to the arguments put forth in the 
literature. With these three cases, I “control” for Republican power but still capture three distinct 
expansion outcomes. In Ohio, expansion succeeded, although Ohio Governor John Kasich used 
an unconventional strategy by expanding Medicaid via the state’s Controlling Board, a little-
known political body. In Tennessee, Governor Bill Haslam failed to expand Medicaid through 
legislative authorization, despite multiple attempts. This case offers insight for how elite framing 
interacts with non-elite framing. In Arizona, Governor Jan Brewer used the most “traditional” 
method—getting approval from her House and Senate. However, a new gubernatorial 
administration threatens the future of Medicaid expansion, leaving the outcome unclear.  
 In order to holistically present the expansion politics in each case, I used primary sources 
from each state’s governor, secondary newspaper data, and third-party non-governmental and 
governmental publications. First, I identified “pivot points,” such as when the NFIB vs. Sebelius 
ruling was decided, when the governor announced the expansion plan, when a committee 
considered the proposal, when the legislature voted on the plan, and when there was a legal 
challenge to expansion. These were important inflections in the trajectory of Medicaid 
expansion, and represented windows for governors to frame expansion. Then, I collected news 
coverage from major state newspapers the days before and days after those “pivot points.” My 
second significant source of data was the governor’s State of the State speeches, which told me 
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which policies were a priority, and how the governor wanted his or her voters to think about 
them. I used this information to identify each governor’s general framing strategies, which fell 
into the following categories: Economic, moral/religious/humanitarian, pragmatic, and political.  
 Existing literature tells us that framing can change public opinion, but whether or not 
framing informs policy outcomes is still undetermined. Thus, my ultimate intent was to estimate 
how much framing mattered for the outcome of expansion in each case. I can suggest that 
framing succeeded if I tracked an increase in public or lawmaker support from right before 
expansion was proposed compared to shortly after. 
 My research examines framing in a real-world context, as opposed to most of the existing 
literature, which analyzes framing effects measured by laboratory experiments. Although 
“framing’s real-world influence might be more limited and contingent than the bulk of 
experimental studies imply,” there is very little non-experimental research on framing.39 A major 
benefit to studying framing in real-world settings is that one can capture the constraints on 
politicians who deploy frames. These constraints include: 1) intra-party coordination, meaning 
that politicians in the same party must use consistent and relevant frames; 2) partisan 
polarization, because citizens are unlikely to be receptive to frames made by the opposing party; 
and 3) media’s discretion in transmitting a frame to the public, which they are not guaranteed to 
do.40 These checks are not fully reflected in an experiment, which typically relies on focus 
groups or public opinion polls.  
 Based on the aforementioned literature and case study approach, the following chapters 
will describe in detail the expansion politics in Ohio, Tennessee, and Arizona. Each case will 
also include the motivations for different framing strategies, in order to set up Chapter 6, which 	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Debate,” Page 2.  
40 Ibid., Page 6.  
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will provide a cross-case analysis and an assessment of the role of framing in expansion 
outcomes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
26 
Chapter 3 
Ohio: Saved By the Controlling Board 
 
Introduction 
 In this chapter I will describe how Ohio’s governor expanded Medicaid despite 
Republican Party control of the government and anti-ACA sentiment. First, I will briefly 
characterize the state’s historical relationship with Medicaid. Then, I will chronologically 
describe Governor John Kasich’s expansion proposal, initial failure, and subsequent success. 
Within each event, I will explore the magnitude of framing as a political force behind Medicaid 
expansion. I argue that the role of framing in this episode was insignificant despite expansion’s 
implementation. Although framing Medicaid as a moral and fiscal imperative fit with Kasich’s 
moderate reputation, he could not successfully convince a skeptical legislature to vote in favor of 
the measure. 
 Despite its location on the edge of the Midwest, Ohio is a crucial player in national 
political outcomes. The state is an amalgam of industrial centers like Cleveland, Toledo, and 
Akron that lean Democrat, and conservative enclaves in Columbus and Cincinnati. State policies 
thus reflect a wide interval of political preferences. Because of its geopolitical diversity, the eye 
of the national political storm lands on Ohio. No Republican candidate has been elected to the 
presidency without winning Ohio.41 And since 1960, Ohioans have never voted for the loser of 
the presidency.42 The importance of elections in Ohio is not limited to policies at the federal 
level. When Ohio adopts a policy, it becomes more palatable to other conservative states.  
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 Considering Ohio as a political trendsetter, its position on healthcare is important for both 
liberals and conservatives, since both voices have constituents in the state. First, it is important to 
establish the health status of Ohioans. United Health Care Foundation ranked Ohio 40th out of 
the 50 states for total population health in 2013. Over 19% of residents live below the poverty 
line.43  Economic trends mirror poor performance on health indicators. Ohio’s manufacturing 
municipalities were hit particularly hard by demographic shifts and de-industrialization in the 
20th century.44 Deindustrialization’s most notable impact was employment; the unemployment 
rate reached nearly 10% in the 1980s.45 Unemployment in turn contributed to a growing 
population without health insurance.46 The downstream effects of those sectoral shifts and 
economic disruption linger today.  
 In 2014, Ohio spent more on health care per capita than 35 other states. Today, Ohio 
spends almost 20% more on Medicaid services than the nationwide average.47 Per capita, Ohio 
spends 16% more on hospital care and 36% more on nursing home care than the nationwide 
average.48 Despite these suboptimal trends, 60% of Ohio’s residents indicated they had an 
“unfavorable opinion” of the ACA.49 That, combined with a red governor’s mansion and a red 
Congress, made Medicaid expansion all the more challenging in Ohio.  Ohio’s conservative 
ideology, GOP legislative stronghold, and shaky fiscal position made Medicaid reform a 
necessary but unlikely policy priority.  
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44 Myron Magnet, “The Resurrection of the Rust Belt,” Fortune Magazine, August 15, 1988. 
45 Bureau of Labor Statistics, Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey.  
46 John Russo and Sherry Lee Linkon, “The Social Costs of Deindustrialization,” Manufacturing a Better Future for 
America, July 2009.  
47 “Healthcare costs in Ohio,” Health Policy Institute of Ohio, December 2014.    
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Pre-Existing Condition: Ohio’s Historical Healthcare Landscape  
 Within a year of the Great Society reforms, Ohio joined a majority of states and adopted 
Medicaid in 1966.50 As the program evolved, the state grappled with challenges such as cost and 
uniform distribution of services. Medicaid was administered county-to-county, and care was 
uneven across the 88 municipalities. Reflecting a national trend at the time, Medicaid costs 
increased exponentially. This squeezed county budgets and raised questions about the program’s 
sustainability.51 
 Prior to the nationwide ACA reforms, healthcare availability in Ohio was limited to a 
small population. In 2008, the following groups were eligible for Medicaid: pregnant women or 
uninsured children in families earning less than 200% FPL and adults with dependents earning 
up to 90% FPL.52 Over 70% of Ohio’s uninsured low-income residents are childless adults, but 
they are omitted from Medicaid.53 These two groups stood to gain insurance with Medicaid 
expansion: parents between 90 and 138% FPL and able-bodied, childless adults between 0 and 
138% FPL. 54 The 2010 Ohio Family Health Survey conducted pre-ACA reported that around 
one-third of nonelderly adults were in families earning less than 138% FPL.55 However, a 
voluntary Medicaid expansion would require sizeable political preference shifts given 
historically stringent eligibility requirements.   
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51 “The Evolution of Medicaid Managed Care in Ohio,” The Center for Health Affairs, September 2007.  
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Medicaid before NFIB vs. Sebelius  
 This portion of the case study will situate Governor Kasich in the post-ACA 
environment. The 2010 governor’s race was a pivot point for healthcare in Ohio. The Republican 
nominee and eventual governor, John Kasich, was a political veteran who had served nearly 
twenty years in the Ohio house. As a ranking member of the House Budget Committee, Kasich 
supported limitations on social benefits. For example, the Penny-Kasich Plan proposed $30 
billion cuts to Medicare by instituting an income requirement.56 He also proposed a market-based 
health reform plan as an alternative to Clinton’s 1993 Health Security Act.57 After his 
congressional stint, Kasich switched his attention to national politics, and opened an exploratory 
committee to run for President in 1999. That campaign ended within six months. Kasich then 
worked in the private sector, at Lehman Brothers, until the company went bankrupt in the 2008 
financial crisis. Healthcare and fiscal conservatism were inextricably linked in Kasich’s early 
politics.58  
 In 2010, Kasich re-emerged in Ohio government. He ran for governor against an 
unopposed Democratic incumbent, Ted Strickland, as well as libertarian and Green party 
candidates. A central part of Kasich’s first gubernatorial campaign was cost-conscious health 
care reform and his vow to “repeal and replace” the ACA. From August to October leading up to 
the November election, Kasich and Strickland polled closely, and election night was one of the 
tightest contests in state history. Kasich won by 80,000 votes—earning 49% to Strickland’s 
47%.59 
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 After barely securing the governorship, Kasich made strategic choices to cement a 
Republican presence in his cabinet. He appointed his running mate, Republican Mary Taylor, 
Lieutenant Governor and director of the Ohio Department of Insurance.60 Taylor had prior 
experience in the Ohio House and as an auditor of the state of Ohio.61 Her position in the 
Department of Insurance is limited to overseeing private insurance and ACA compliance, not 
Medicaid administration.  
 Lieutenant Governor Taylor was vocal about the pitfalls of the ACA. Since 2010, Taylor 
has delivered over 20 speeches condemning the ACA.62 In 2011, six months into her new 
position, Taylor penned an article which was published on the Ohio Department of Insurance 
website and on many local news platforms. Her op-ed is a step-by-step criticism of reforms in 
Obama’s “convoluted…job-killing” healthcare plan.63 In 2014, she stated that she “could not 
name a single thing” that the “catastrophic” bill did well.64 Kasich’s Lieutenant Governor 
appointment would serve as an additional hurdle for framing expansion because he would have 
to maintain consistent political preferences in his administration. On one hand, he and Taylor 
share opposition to the ACA, but Taylor’s extensive and highly public anti-ACA record would 
make it difficult to justify supporting Medicaid expansion, a central part of the ACA.  
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 Despite being at odds with national health reform efforts, Kasich was tasked with making 
good on his campaign promises to reform healthcare.65 One tab on Kasich’s campaign website is 
devoted to his umbrella goal of modernizing Medicaid.66 Within this broad objective, Kasich’s 
team drafted smaller goals including extending coverage to more Ohioans, creating a political 
body for Medicaid administration, and improving the application process for beneficiaries. 
Although he campaigned to “repeal and replace” the ACA, Kasich had started the process of 
expanding Medicaid in accordance with federal law.67  
 The governor initiated a series of administrative changes to expedite ACA 
implementation. In 2011, he established the Office of Health Transformation (OHT) to 
modernize Medicaid. OHT also streamlined health information technology information systems, 
improved payment systems, and consolidated certain health services. Kasich tapped Greg 
Moody, who had both private and public service experience in healthcare, to serve as OHT 
director. Moody’s previous work on Medicaid focused on system performance and consulting on 
complex health care programs.68  Kasich also invested in home health care and skilled nursing 
facilities.69 These actions reflect the administrative tasks required to be in compliance with the 
ACA.  
 Kasich’s first State of the State speech was pro-Medicaid. A focal point was the 
pragmatism of the new Medicaid plan, which was mentioned by name seven times. The governor 
emphasized how his Medicaid proposal was out of the box, “reform-oriented,” and “forward-
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looking.” He stated, “[it’s] the kind of thing that makes sense.” With political bodies like OHT 
already in place, Kasich framed expansion as a straightforward, practical next step.70 
 In his 2012 State of the State address, before the Supreme Court ruling that made 
expansion optional, Kasich emphasized the moral obligation that Ohioans had to lobby on behalf 
of the mentally ill, the disabled, and the poor. Kasich announced:  “Somebody has got to stand 
up for them. Oh, they have a lobbyist, but we don’t see Him here. Best lobbyist in the world. 
We’ll all meet Him some day. So, you can’t step on these folks…that would be sinful. That 
would be wrong.”71 In this instance, Kasich made a pathos appeal. An emotional and theological 
frame called on voters to think of Medicaid expansion as something more than a political issue. 
Emphasizing the Christian elements of expansion shifted the lens for voters to understand 
Medicaid expansion. As discussed in the literature review, framing might alter public preference 
or public discourse around expansion. Directly telling Ohioans that not expanding Medicaid is a 
sin evokes a different set of beliefs and emotions than telling voters that opposing expansion will 
insulate Ohio from an uncertain agreement with the federal government.  
 The NFIB vs. Sebelius decision was the next turning point in Ohio’s journey to Medicaid 
expansion. Kasich continued to roll out healthcare infrastructure after the Court’s decision. In 
2013, Kasich created the Ohio Department of Medicaid, the state’s first-ever state-level agency 
focused on efficiency and effectiveness.72 Kasich further streamlined the accounting and 
dissemination systems associated with Medicaid. John McCarthy, who had previously served as 
Washington, D.C.’s Medicaid Director, was named director. The agency’s main goal was to 
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track spending and strategize to minimize expenditures.73 The department was also an additional 
accomplishment Kasich could reference in his eventual appeal for expansion. Through OHT and 
the Ohio Department of Medicaid, the organizational foundation for lawmakers to consider 
expansion was set.  
  
An Unwavering Legislature 
 Kasich initiated Medicaid expansion in February 2013 when he proposed a biennial 
budget including expansion to the General Assembly. At the time, Republicans held a decisive 
majority in both chambers: they outnumbered Democrats 23-10 in the Senate and 60-39 in the 
House.74 In the House, Democrats needed at least 11 Republican votes to approve expansion. 
Kasich’s expansion plan would cover individuals earning up to 138% of FPL, a 38% increase.75 
This population of low-income childless adults was estimated to be around 300,000 Ohioans.76  
 In anticipation of partisan backlash, the governor presented five defenses of his plan 
alongside the proposal.77 First, Kasich claimed that expanding Medicaid was not in any capacity 
supporting the ACA. The Republican Party and Kasich’s mantra of “repeal and replace” 
contradicts this defense; if Kasich wanted to repeal the ACA, this expansion opportunity would 
also be eliminated. Kasich disputes this notion. This informational reconciliation did not go 
unnoticed. Ohio Tea Party leader Tom Zawistowski observed: Kasich “jams through Medicaid 
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expansion at the same time he’s saying, ‘Join me in repealing the Affordable Care Act’” and 
called the move “schizophrenic.”78 
 Second, Kasich suggested that Medicaid expansion would bring valuable federal funds 
into Ohio, a common justification for expansion.79 Kasich tried to appeal to fiscally minded 
House representatives with convincing figures of statewide savings that would result from 
Medicaid expansion. Kasich’s argument was that refusing expansion diverted federal money to 
other states, indirectly hurting Ohio.80  This argument was particularly relevant for hospitals. 
According to Seth Vilensky, a former hospital administrator at the Cleveland Clinic, the burden 
on hospitals for “charity care” forced cuts in other service areas. Like most hospitals, the 
Cleveland Clinic would treat individuals without insurance, but would have to write off huge 
costs for uncompensated care. Vilensky noted that with expansion, “The benefit for hospitals is 
that there is a new portion of the population that have some payer source.”81 In states with dire 
budget concerns, the share of federal money often convinced skeptical politicians to support 
expansion. 
 Third, in light of the Supreme Court’s ruling, Kasich claimed expansion was a 
declaration of states’ rights. Since states administer Medicaid, expansion would increase the 
state’s administrative capacity, which is favorable for states’ rights advocates. Republicans who 
criticized the unwieldy size of federal government embraced this federalist argument. Fourth, 
Kasich made a humanitarian appeal to constituents—that expansion would improve the health 
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outcomes of Ohioans.82 In his 2011, 2012, and 2013 State of the State speeches, Kasich cited 
Medicaid as a major necessity for individuals with mental illnesses or substance abuse problems. 
He used anecdotes about Ohioans being refused emergency room care because they were 
uninsured as a plea to voters.83  Finally, Kasich defended his position on the grounds that 
heralded conservatives of the past—namely, former President Ronald Reagan—also expanded 
Medicaid.84  
 Despite Kasich’s anticipatory strategy, on April 18, 2013, the House approved the state 
budget without Medicaid expansion by a partisan vote of 61-35.85 The budget then moved to the 
Senate for consideration.  By late June, the Senate also confirmed the budget without expansion. 
Both the House and the Senate also voted in favor of an amendment prohibiting Kasich from 
using federal funds for expansion without formal legislative approval.86  This decision limited 
the governor’s options for expansion. The budget was sent to Kasich, who exercised the line item 
veto to remove that constraint before approving the budget.87 Because a budget needed to be 
passed by the start of the fiscal year, July 1, expansion was tabled.88 
 Kasich’s main expansion foe, the Ohio House Republican caucus, mounted opposition 
from two perspectives: electability and ideology. The Republican Speaker of the House had to 
uphold his reputation of principled, by-the-books conservative policymaking. If expansion 
succeeded under his supervision, that legacy would be tainted. Secondly, House Republicans 
wanted to prevent a highly transparent and permanent roll call vote on expansion. A 	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straightforward yes/no vote would give upcoming GOP challengers more traction to contest 
seats. The Ohio Tea party had been clear that they would fund Republican challengers for seats 
occupied by Medicaid expansion supporters.89   
 This group of GOP opponents was separate from the 20 GOP representatives who “might 
shoot themselves” before voting for expansion for ideological reasons—they opposed social 
welfare policies. Tea Party activists denounced Kasich as a true Republican. Ohio Rising, a Tea 
Party 501(c)(4) focused on “liberating” Ohio from ACA mandates, led the movement opposing 
Kasich’s administration. The group’s director, Chris Littleton, stated of their rejection efforts: 
“‘we don't take any great joy in [blocking Medicaid expansion]. We aren't doing this to get 
something from somebody…we sincerely believe [expansion] is really bad for Ohio and really 
bad for the long-term financial stability of Ohio.’”90  Republicans in the General Assembly were 
not available for persuasion because they were concerned about ideological integrity or 
electability. This sentiment was at odds with the 63% of Ohio voters who favored expansion in 
June 2014.91  	  
Kasich’s Last Resort 
 With the legislature firm in their intent to block Medicaid expansion, made especially 
clear by their attempt to include written policy requiring legislative approval before accepting 
federal Medicaid dollars, Kasich switched gears. In October 2013, the governor turned to the 
Controlling Board, a seven-member panel led by the director of Ohio’s Office of Budget and 
Management. The nearly-100-year-old institution was unique—only a handful of states had a 
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similar body.92 The Controlling Board allowed the governor to circumvent the traditional 
legislative process in the House and Senate.  While Kasich had never used the Controlling Board 
before, it has historically approved requests relating to education, environmental, transportation, 
and technology.93 
 After some political finagling, the seven seats of the 2014 Controlling Board were set in 
Kasich’s favor. On October 21, 2013, Ohio Medicaid director John McCarthy requested the 
Controlling Board to approve the Ohio Department of Medicaid’s use of federal funds to cover 
newly eligible Medicaid recipients.94 As expected, the Controlling Board voted 5-2 in favor of 
expansion.95  
 In Ohio, the puzzle surrounding Medicaid expansion is not simply why it was successful 
given conservative state politics. Rather, the question is why Kasich leveraged so much—
electability, ties to the GOP, relationship with his legislature—to pursue expansion. Why did 
Kasich go beyond the traditional scope of gubernatorial policymaking to use the Controlling 
Board to pursue a policy his constituents rejected? There is one umbrella explanation: Kasich’s 
history of moderate and moral policymaking. 
 Even before Kasich entered the governor’s office in Ohio, he had long-term political 
prospects. In 1999, he launched his first run for the Republican presidential nomination, but 
withdrew from the race within five months.96 However, those aspirations laid the foundation for 
strategic political moves in the decade that followed. Kasich needed to have a distinguishable 
brand, a solid character profile, and legislative accomplishments. Kasich’s experience as 	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chairman of the national House Budget Committee and bipartisan work on the 1997 Balanced 
Budget Act provided historical precedence for pursuing policy that would help the bottom line.  
He established himself as a proactive, budget-oriented, moderate Republican. As governor, he 
called himself the CEO of Ohio.97 
 Medicaid expansion tied into this persona. As Kasich saw it, Medicaid expansion was a 
“fast-track” of funds into Ohio, money that would go directly to furthering his in-progress health 
reforms. This fiscal frame served Kasich, who today has a 60% approval rating, and the state of 
Ohio, which now has a $2 billion surplus and a 5% unemployment rate. Kasich’s framing of 
Medicaid expansion as a fiscal issue bolstered his individual political platform, and separated 
him from a field of ideologically bound conservatives.98  
 Framing Medicaid as a moral decision also fit in with Kasich’s character. When he spoke 
to the legislature, the media, or concerned citizens, Kasich used religious and “right vs. wrong” 
appeals to make voters connect Medicaid with charity, morality, and generosity. In late 2013, he 
stated that Medicaid expansion would help those “that live in the shadows of life.” 99 The 
governor targeted the mentally ill, drug-addicted, and working poor as deserving populations that 
needed treatment, care, and assistance.100 He encouraged Republican opponents to look at how 
the Bible suggests treating the poor.101 In a well-cited instance, Kasich commented to an opposed 
Ohio legislator: “Now, when you die and get to the meeting with Saint Peter, he’s probably not 
going to ask you much about what you did about keeping government small. But he is going to 
ask you what you did for the poor. You better have a good answer.”102 In addition to being a 	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pragmatic decision, Kasich described Medicaid expansion as “a matter of life or death.”103 
Kasich positioned Medicaid as a right versus wrong and biblical imperative.104 
 Kasich’s legislative circumvention did not go unnoticed by conservatives. Thirty House 
Republicans signed a letter opposing the Governor’s Controlling Board maneuver.105 Within a 
few months, there was an expected legal challenge to Kasich’s use of the Controlling Board. The 
Ohio Supreme Court heard a lawsuit brought forth by dozens of Republican legislators against 
the Controlling Board. The plaintiffs cited the Ohio Code, which states that the Controlling 
Board cannot act in a way that deviated from the legislative intent of the General Assembly. 
According to the plaintiffs, legislative intent was established in the House and Senate-approved 
budget with the language stating that they opposed the governor pursuing expansion without 
legislative approval. But when Kasich employed the line-item veto to eliminate the clause that 
would have prevented Controlling Board use, the legislature never attempted to override the 
veto. The Court rejected the challenge, upholding expansion.106    
 
Kasich’s Re-Election 
 Kasich risked significant political capital by using the Controlling Board for expansion, 
which is traditionally a legislative responsibility. Republicans criticized Kasich for  “effectively 
crimping the legislative process.”107 Another Republican representative described the events as 
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“thinly veiled legislation.”108 But this political risk was not punitive in the short-term—Kasich 
was re-elected governor by a wide margin. On the heels of Medicaid expansion, Kasich easily 
secured a second term as governor, winning 86 of 88 counties and 64% of the vote, compared to 
Democrat Ed FitzGerald’s 33%.109 FitzGerald’s disorganization and internal controversy 
distracted the campaign from policy debate; consequently, Medicaid was not a notable issue. The 
Tea Party, who supported Kasich in 2010, declined to endorse his 2014 re-election campaign 
because of Medicaid expansion.110   
 A NBC News exit poll found that 91% of Kasich voters felt the ACA as a policy “went 
too far,” but 80% of Kasich voters approved of the way he “carried out” the ACA.111 Barring the 
methodological problems with exit polls, these data show incongruence between voter preference 
and elected officials’ actions.  Although voters were satisfied with ACA implementation in Ohio, 
presumably including Medicaid expansion, Ohio lawmakers were not. Republican lawmaker 
views on expansion may have contributed to the successful Democratic challenge of five House 
seats previously held by Republicans. Although this shift did not change the overall GOP 
majority, it does indicate that some Republicans may have been punished for not supporting 
Medicaid expansion. The partisan breakdown in the Senate remained unchanged in the 2014 
election.112  
 In 2014 and 2015, during Kasich’s second term, after Medicaid expansion passed, Kasich 
spent little time discussing expansion’s outcome. Perhaps this is because Ohio has not yet 
assumed the small percentage of the expansion cost, so other more immediate budgetary issues 	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received more attention. Another explanation is Kasich’s popularity and the demonstrated voter 
support for expansion. Post-expansion frames are targeted to protecting electability, whereas pre-
expansion frames are targeted to Republican voters in Republican districts. Kasich won a second 
term by a wide margin despite the expansion controversy, so he has not had to justify his 
decision to Ohioans. Now that Kasich is a presidential candidate, however, he frequently cites 
Medicaid expansion as an example of his cooperative governing style and willingness to look 
beyond partisan battles.113 
 This case study illustrates one state’s Medicaid expansion success in spite of a GOP 
legislative majority, Republican governor, and resistance to the ACA. Because the governor was 
unable to enact expansion via the legislature, framing appeared to be a marginal factor in the 
outcome of expansion. Kasich’s frames did not successfully persuade the Republican legislative 
caucus, but it is possible that competing frames did succeed in keeping Republican opponents 
decidedly anti-expansion. Perhaps because Kasich knew the Controlling Board was an available 
option, moral and fiscal frames appealed to his moderate constituents more so than lawmakers.  
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Chapter 4 
Tennessee: Governor Haslam Sings the Medicaid Blues 
  
Introduction 
 This chapter provides a chronology of Medicaid expansion in Tennessee. After providing 
a broad snapshot of the healthcare landscape in Tennessee, I will explain the political 
developments that preceded the turning point for my research question—the 2012 Supreme 
Court decision that made Medicaid optional. Then, I will describe the process by which 
Governor Bill Haslam introduced Medicaid expansion to the legislature. What caused his plan to 
fail, revive, and fail again? This is the only case study where I examine a state in which Medicaid 
expansion did not succeed. Framing appeared fruitless against the ideologically ingrained 
General Assembly. However, it is plausible that frames put forth by “roving billionaires” and 
interest groups resonated more with Republican voters and Republican lawmakers.114 
 Aside from geographic diversity—the state spans a latitudinal swath of Appalachia and 
the South—Tennessee is culturally multi-faceted with a combination of rural agriculture, heavy 
industry, and country music.115 Memphis is both the birthplace of the blues and the site of Martin 
Luther King, Jr.’s assassination. Nashville, the cosmopolitan capital, contrasts with the Blue 
Ridge Mountains and a decisively southern food culture. This variety means that political 
representatives are accountable to a wide array of constituents, and thus political preferences. 
The dominant political ideology, reflected in partisan composition of the General Assembly, is 
conservative. 	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 Health indicators are as far from uniform as Tennessee’s culture. Tennessee consistently 
ranks in the bottom quintile of national health indicators like obesity rates, per capita income, 
and education attainment. In 2010, Tennessee had the 8th shortest life expectancy in the nation.117 
In 2014, median annual household income was just above $40,000, the 7th lowest in the 
country.118 The proportion of Tennessee’s population that goes without health insurance was 
10% in 2014, placing the state in the bottom quintile for coverage.119 United Health Foundation 
ranked Tennessee 45th among all states for overall health.120 Thus, Tennessee can be grouped 
with states like Mississippi, Alabama, or South Carolina, which have a potentially lethal 
combination of weak healthcare infrastructure and low health status. These states also share 
opposition to health care reforms, despite demonstrated need. 
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Year Senate (D) Senate (R) House (D) House (R) Party 
Control 
2011 13 19 33 64 Republican 
2012 13 20 34 64 Republican 
2013 7 26 28 70 Republican 
2014 7 26 27 71 Republican 
2015 5 28 26 73 Republican 
2016 5 28 26 73 Republican 
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The State’s Medicaid History  
 Tennessee’s historically marbled relationship with Medicaid is important to contextualize 
the expansion attempt. Tennessee did not adopt Medicaid until 1969, four years after it was 
introduced nationally. Over the subsequent decades, efforts to enlarge the program exacerbated a 
precarious financial situation. In fiscal year 1987-1988, Medicaid expenditures hovered around 
$1 billion, but grew to nearly $3 billion by the 1992-1993 fiscal year. This exponential spending 
growth reflected rising healthcare costs, not an increase in participants. With 15% of the 1993 
population using Medicaid services, then-governor Ned McWherther seized a  “‘window of 
opportunity’” to gain legislative approval to design a new state Medicaid system focused on 
expanded coverage and managed care. This unlikely program would eventually be known as 
TennCare. Broadly, the goals of TennCare were to reduce costs and expand coverage. 
TennCare’s birth in 1994 was one of the earliest waiver-led state Medicaid plans, and its core 
structure mirrored many of the goals outlined in the ACA. For example, the program relied on 
private sector managed care insurance programs rather than a fee-for-service model.121 
 But by the late 1990’s, the program began to unravel. Enrollment declines were met with 
spending increases, a contradiction that concerned both political and medical stakeholders. 
Because of low reimbursement rates and unreliable TennCare administrators who inconsistently 
confirmed which patients were on TennCare, hospitals around Tennessee began refusing 
TennCare patients. Although the hospitals concerns’ were allayed through a piece-meal solution, 
TennCare was slowly being dismantled. On December 15, 1999, Blue Cross Blue Shield 
Tennessee (TennCare’s largest managed care organization—a group that would provide 
coverage plans for Medicaid recipients) announced they wanted to withdraw from TennCare.122 	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Eventually, they reversed their termination notice, but the action prompted other managed care 
organizations to reconsider their involvement with TennCare.123  
 2005 was a decisive year for TennCare. Former governor Phil Bredesen was faced with 
the possibility that the state would go bankrupt if TennCare was not cut. Beyond the state 
expenditure crisis was concern that individuals on TennCare were making deliberate  “‘lifestyle 
choices’” to work for employers who did not provide health insurance. Bredesen noted that 
TennCare cuts were justified because “‘the world is full of people’” who select jobs based on 
insurance provision, and Tennesseans should not be any different. The Bredesen era cemented 
the association between Medicaid and less-deserving individuals, which would make Medicaid 
expansion a difficult task down the road.124  
 In response to concern about the strength of TennCare’s financial foundation, the 
business-minded Bredesen hired McKinsey & Company to review TennCare’s business model. 
The results were sobering: the report found that TennCare was unsustainable and would soon 
obstruct other state spending needs. By 2006, the program had fractured: around 200,000 
individuals were no longer eligible for benefits, and the risk sharing system was effectively 
removed. Academic and health reform advocate Gordon Bonnyman described the failure of 
TennCare as a political maneuver to “strip…budget decisions of their human consequences.” 
The TennCare saga left unpleasant memories of fiscal mismanagement and inefficient care 
delivery. The program’s blemished legacy also made further healthcare innovation challenging 
because opponents could connect new initiatives to TennCare.125  
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Tennessee Medicaid Pre-Sebelius  
 In 2009, Bill Haslam, a moderate Republican, private sector veteran and experienced 
family businessman, announced his campaign for governor. Haslam was not a bread and butter 
politician; his family truck stop business was so successful that Haslam’s net worth is estimated 
at $2 billion, making him the wealthiest elected official in 2015.126 He had served two terms as 
Mayor of Knoxville, where he stabilized their economy and tripled the rainy day fund.127 Haslam 
easily succeeded in the Republican primary, and was elected governor with 65% of the vote.128 
His campaign generally shied away from social issues, which he called “’frustrating and a 
distraction.’”129 Haslam’s campaign platform focused on economic development—particularly 
job growth.  
 During his first term, Haslam established himself as a principled Republican in the 
healthcare space. Haslam criticized the ACA for hurting small businesses and for expanding an 
already inefficient system. He opted not to establish a Tennessee-run healthcare exchange, 
instead deferring to the federal program. Although this move was praised by conservatives and 
hailed as a rebuke of the President, it goes against a core conservative principle of federalism and 
state’s rights. Tennessee gave up the opportunity to operate their own health insurance 
marketplace, and instead increased federal oversight and intervention. Nonetheless, Republican 
Party elites supported Haslam’s decision.130   
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Tennessee’s Turn  
 The following section explains the trajectory, and eventual failure, of expansion in 
Tennessee. From 2012 to 2014, the two years between the option for Medicaid expansion and 
Governor Haslam’s re-election campaign, the onus fell to the states to make a major policy move 
on Medicaid. Medicaid expansion was certainly on the governor’s agenda—AHealthyTN 
presented a pro-expansion petition to the governor with 4,500 signatures. 131 Haslam pledged to 
make a decision regarding expansion by fall 2013, a promise that would eventually be 
delayed.132 During 2012 and most of 2013, Haslam resisted moving forward with what he, along 
with other Republicans, called “traditional” Medicaid—a rhetorical attempt to link expansion 
and the ACA. The governor rejected “pure” Medicaid expansion “under wholly federal 
auspices.”133 Haslam framed Obama’s Medicaid expansion as conventional, but he was only 
interested in supporting an innovative, Tennessee-specific program. He wanted a plan that was 
something more than “’Medicaid with lipstick on it.’”134 This frame sought to separate future 
expansion bills from pre-conceived perceptions of Obama’s reform. Maintaining a rhetorical silo 
between the ACA and Medicaid expansion was crucial for Haslam to convince an anti-ACA 
legislature and voting base that expansion was necessary.  
 
Haslam’s Re-Election 
 In November 2014, the incumbent Haslam was re-elected in a historic landslide victory. 
There were no credible challengers: a weak Democratic candidate was announced with less than 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 A pro-expansion interest group. 
  
R. Neal, “Coalition presents TennCare/Medicaid expansion petition to governor,” Knox Views, June 6, 
2013. 
132 Bennett, TennCare, One State’s Experiment, Page 132. 
133 Jackson Baker, “Another chance for Insure Tennessee,” Memphis Magazine, August 1, 2015.  
134 Rick Lyman, “Tennessee Governor Hesitates on Medicaid Expansion, Frustrating Many,” The New York Times, 
November 16, 2013.  
48 
a year until the election, and no strong conservative alternative ever emerged.135 Haslam won all 
95 of Tennessee’s counties and 70% of the vote.136  
 Haslam’s resounding success was due in part to his policy progress and reputation for 
getting things done during his first term as governor. Haslam reformed primary and higher 
education, the civil service, and taxes—all accomplishments that highlighted his fiscal 
conservatism and growth-minded leadership.137 In his second-term victory speech, Haslam noted 
that during his first term, Tennessee achieved the lowest per-capita debt in the country. He also 
praised the education system, which boosted learning proficiencies in math and science at the 
primary level and now guaranteed high school graduates two years of free community college or 
vocational education.138  On the employment side, Tennessee added hundreds of thousands of 
private sector jobs and was named “State of the Year” for economic development twice in a 
row.139    
 Shortly into his second term, on December 15, 2014, the governor announced a two-year 
pilot program called “Insure Tennessee.”140 The plan would provide healthcare to individuals 
earning up to 138% FPL.141 At stake were the nearly 300,000 Tennesseans in the Medicaid 
coverage gap.142  Unlike Medicaid expansion in other states, Insure Tennessee is cost-neutral 
because hospitals shoulder the cost not borne by the federal government. Tennessee followed the 
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lead of other states pursuing expansion and included a “firewall” that automatically eliminates 
coverage if federal funding becomes insufficient.143 
 When Haslam first introduced his plan, he noted that Insure Tennessee was a departure 
from traditional Medicaid expansion, a better approach than what would have been possible in 
2012 after the Sebelius decision. Insure Tennessee was, according to the governor, a 
“conservative approach that introduce[d] market principles to Medicaid.”144 
 Haslam’s early frames were three-pronged: fiscal, pragmatic, and rhetorical. First, the 
finances were budget-neutral: as long as the federal government made good on their promise to 
cover 90% of the expansion costs after 2020, hospitals would cover the remaining fees.145 
Haslam could empirically back up his claim that Insure Tennessee was a market-oriented plan 
that would not increase Tennessee’s leverage. This was an advantage for a state with precarious 
finances.  
 The pragmatic framing of Insure Tennessee focused on improving health outcomes and 
saving hospitals. Beginning in 2010, layoffs in the state’s hospitals garnered nationwide attention 
because health systems—ranging from Community Health Systems Inc. to Hospital Corporation 
of America Holdings Inc. to the academic medical centers at Vanderbilt University and the 
University of Tennessee—are among Tennessee’s largest employers. Without federal subsidies 
and funds from expansion, hospitals in Tennessee stood to see a 2-5% drop in earnings. This 
would translate to further layoffs and hospital closures.146 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143 “Insure Tennessee: The Basics,” Tennessee Justice Center. 
144 Dave Boucher, “Tennessee’s GOP Gov. to expand Medicaid program,” The Tennessean, December 15, 2014.  
 
“Haslam calls for ‘extraordinary session.’” The Lebanon Democrat, Jan. 9 2015. 
145 Alex Tolbert, “Why Medicaid expansion failed in Tennessee,” The Tennessean, February 10, 2015.  
146 Lyman, “Tennessee Governor Hesitates on Medicaid Expansion, Frustrating Many.” 
 
Zachary Tracer, “In Tennessee, Hospitals Want Obamacare, Republicans Don’t,” Bloomberg Politics, June 
23, 2015.  
50 
 The third frame was a strategy Haslam knew succeeded in states like Arkansas, 
Michigan, and Kentucky, among others. Creating rhetorical distance between the ACA and 
Tennessee’s Medicaid expansion was arguably a political necessity. It allowed the space for 
Republican governors who previously rejected the national health reforms to embrace one of the 
bill’s core components. This frame sought to shift the debate from  “‘pure politics to 
pragmatism.’”147  
 These pre-expansion frames are directed at legislators who may be open to persuasion on 
expansion. However, the plan also landed on welcome ears outside of the formal political 
system. Three major stakeholders, the Tennessee Hospital Association, the Tennessee Business 
Roundtable, and the Tennessee Medical Association, were on board with Insure Tennessee.148 
 Tennessee’s fiscally frazzled hospitals149 pledged to pay for the costs incurred by the 
state, which amounted to nearly $75 million.150 Essentially, Haslam’s plan and subsequent 
negotiations ensured the state would not be accountable for any of the costs associated with 
increasing Medicaid eligibility. Although other governors reduced their state budget load by 
passing hospital assessments, no other state had the entire outstanding cost covered by a non-
state agent. Research such as a PricewaterhouseCoopers Health Research Institute’s report found 
that in states that expanded Medicaid, hospital revenue increased and more individuals were 
covered. America’s third largest publicly traded hospital conglomerate, Tenet Healthcare 
Corporation, found that in its hospitals in states that accepted federal Medicaid dollars, uninsured 
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admitted patients dropped nearly 63%. Uncompensated care is a major drain on hospitals, which 
sometimes must resort to refusing care for individuals without coverage.151   
 Finally, Haslam found support from the Tennessee Business Roundtable, an advocacy 
group representing business, health, and civic voices. In a press release, Executive Director 
Charlie Howorth explained his agency’s support for Insure Tennessee. He described the plan as a 
“departure from the traditional Washington way of expanding Medicaid” because Insure 
Tennessee is a “Tennessee solution to a Tennessee problem.” The organization formed an 80-
member coalition focused on supporting Insure Tennessee. In line with their business interests, 
the Tennessee Business Roundtable underscored the market implications of refusing expansion: 
tax dollars would be re-routed to other less-deserving states like New York or Connecticut. The 
organization also praised Haslam for bringing this money into Tennessee without issuing new 
taxes or re-routing other funding. Many of these messages—no new taxes, improved budgeting, 
and increased revenue—paralleled Haslam’s own frames.152 
 Unsurprisingly, medical groups also came out in support of Haslam’s plan. The President 
of the Tennessee Medicaid Association warned that without expansion, a “‘health care crisis’” 
would ensue.153 Their support was instrumental in directing the expansion debate away from 
politics and towards health and the idea that people would tangibly benefit from Medicaid 
expansion. 
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 Even Haslam’s wavering foe came out in support of Insure Tennessee. Haslam’s 
Lieutenant Governor, Ron Ramsey, had previously spoken out against Medicaid expansion, but 
changed his tune in 2014.154 Ramsey supported his governor, stating: 
 “When a state has an opportunity to take power away from the federal government and 
institute real conservative reform, that is an opportunity that must be taken seriously. Governor 
Haslam has negotiated a deal which returns tax dollars back to Tennessee while using 
conservative principles to bring health insurance to more Tennesseans.”155 With a combination 
of some political and interest group support, Haslam appeared to have cemented a path for 
expansion to succeed.  
 
First Round Failure 
 After proposing expansion, Haslam travelled all over Tennessee, reminding his 
constituents that Insure Tennessee was not “Obamacare.” His distancing tactics appeared to pay-
off: a poll showed that while 85% of Tennessee Republicans opposed “Obamacare,” only 16% 
opposed “Insure Tennessee.”156 A 2014 Vanderbilt University poll found that 58% of registered 
voters supported expansion.157 These numbers and the negligible cost of Insure Tennessee 
seemed to be a respectable counter argument to opponents’ ammunition.  
 Tennessee is unique in that interest groups and think tank organizations served as major 
obstacles in the expansion process. Haslam’s biggest obstacle came from beyond the traditional 
political playing field. Americans for Prosperity (AFP) is a conservative advocacy group best 
known for advancing the causes of the Tea Party.  They also worked to disrupt the 
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implementation of the ACA, especially Medicaid expansion. AFP is primarily backed by the 
Koch brothers, and is an increasingly influential power in state politics.158  
 In Tennessee, AFP spent human and financial capital to sway Republicans against 
expansion: they sent out mailings to Republican voters, bought radio ads warning residents that 
Republican lawmakers who intended to vote expansion were actually supporting “Obamacare,” 
and sent nearly 100 protestors to the statehouse. AFP President Tim Phillips said of blocking 
expansion in Tennessee: “‘Republicans have a once-in-a-generation opportunity to practice what 
they preach, which is limited government.’”159 
 It is important to note that the AFP’s presence is nothing new to Tennessee’s governor or 
his General Assembly. Rather, AFP’s activity served to change the message and audience of the 
governor’s appeals. The governor had to strategically provide lawmakers a justification for 
supporting expansion that would hold up when they had to explain their voting record during a 
re-election. Haslam also had to devise an electoral cost for legislators who might not vote for 
expansion.  
 Haslam’s “Going Public” strategy—travelling around the state and meeting with voters 
and interest groups—produced one desired result, voter enthusiasm. If the voters demonstrated 
that they favored Medicaid expansion, vacillating lawmakers would have an incentive to vote for 
expansion—to represent their constituents’ preferences. Voter support would also mitigate 
AFP’s threat to unseat pro-expansion Republicans in the next general election.  
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 Despite these preventative measures, on February 4, 2015, the Senate Health and Welfare 
Committee voted 7-4 against “Insure Tennessee.”160 Democratic lawmakers, who were out-
numbered 28-5 in the Senate and 73-26 in the House, favored expansion.161 Democrat House 
Minority Leader Craig Fitzhugh endorsed the plan, as did Republican Senators Lamar Alexander 
and Bob Corker.162 Both Senators voted against the ACA in 2010, but Alexander said Insure 
Tennessee “‘is a step in the right direction,’” and Corker agreed.163 When the legislative session 
adjourned, the lone Democrat on the Senate Health and Welfare Committee called the failure of 
Insure Tennessee the “biggest failure” of the legislature.164  
 While the Health and Welfare Committee vote was not narrow or contested, it was 
notable that three of the four favorable votes were Republican Senators. Republican Senator and 
physician Richard Briggs was a leader in this attempt at expansion—he represented health 
advocates and Tennesseans who recognized the importance of health coverage.165 Another 
Republican advocate, Becky Massey, was a consistent supporter of Insure Tennessee, given that 
there was “‘no question [expansion] would make a positive different on people’s health.’”166 The 
third Republican Senator, Ed Jackson, defended his decision for procedural reasons. Jackson 
stated: “‘I felt like [expansion] needed to go along to the other committees instead of just seven 
people deciding on it’” but also mentioned that Tennessee needed to address that it was “‘on the 
bottom’” of national health.167 Framing appeared to be insignificant, as none of the “yes” votes 
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referenced voter support in their justification. Despite an overwhelming 86% statewide approval 
rating at the time, Haslam’s gubernatorial stronghold could not overcome the legislature.168  
  Within committee, justifications for voting against the proposal ranged from the sheer 
amount of information and detail to parse through to the fact that the plan created a “new 
entitlement program” that “expanded government” and Medicaid.169 One opposed Republican 
described expansion as “’a tube of toothpaste with both ends cut off. Anywhere you touch it, it 
squeezes out and you can’t shove it back in the tube once it’s done.’”170 
 Despite endorsements from the Governor and the Lieutenant Governor, opposition also 
came from high-ranking congressional Republicans. Opponents of expansion were concerned 
with the integrity of the federal fund match and with being seen as collaborating with the Obama 
administration. Republican House Caucus Chair Glen Casada had given expansion “even odds” 
of passing, although he voted against the plan.171 Republican House Majority Leader Gerald 
McCormick justified his opposition on “mistrust of the federal government” to keep their 
commitment to pay for Medicaid expansion.172 The message from the Republican leadership was 
clear: expansion was at ideological odds with their vision for Tennessee.  
 After the vote, an AFP national spokesperson proclaimed Tennessee a success story that 
would discourage other Republican governors from pursuing expansion.173 While the actions of 
the AFP alone cannot explain the plan’s rejection, what is clear is that Haslam had to balance 
frames to both constituents and powerful outside groups, who have incongruent information 
streams and motivations. AFP targeted conservative lawmakers, implicitly suggesting to voters 	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that their party leaders may not be serving their fundamental interests. AFP reminded Republican 
lawmakers and voters of GOP’s opposition to Obama and the ACA, and served as a watchdog 
when politicians strayed from those beliefs by supporting expansion. 
 Perhaps the governor mistakenly invested public space, like appearances, and political 
capital in Tennessee voters when instead, he truly needed to convince influential interest groups 
who have more power over the General Assembly’s voting preferences. Alternatively, perhaps 
lawmakers were more receptive to interest group frames.  
  
Familiar Fate: “Politics over democracy”174 
 Within two months of Haslam’s failed expansion endeavor, a group of Democratic 
senators, with Haslam’s support, submitted Senate Joint Resolution 0093, a new plan for 
Medicaid expansion. In a similar fashion to the first attempt at Medicaid expansion, interest 
groups played a crucial role in the bill’s outcome. The Tennessee Justice Center, which had been 
a strong advocate for the governor’s February proposal, boosted their grassroots efforts when a 
second chance for expansion emerged. They cold-called and sent activists out door-to-door to 
petition Tennesseans to call on Lieutenant Governor Ron Ramsey to push Insure Tennessee to a 
full Senate vote.175 
 The new proposal narrowly escaped a subcommittee vote by a 3-2 margin to advance for 
review by the Senate Health and Welfare Committee (the same committee that deliberated on the 
governor’s original proposal). The legislation was not expansion per se; rather, it would 
authorize Haslam to move forward with using federal funds to cover newly eligible Medicaid 
recipients. On March 25, 2015, the Health and Welfare Committee passed the measure by a vote 	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of 6-2.176 The two nays were Republican Senators, as were five of the six “yes” votes. Four of 
the six favorable votes originally supported expansion in 2014. The one convert, Republican 
Rusty Crowe, initially voted against expansion because he anticipated the bill would fail, but 
after rebuke from his district and supporters in the medical community, voted in support.177 The 
remaining “yes” vote came from Doug Overbey, who did not participate in the initial vote that 
killed expansion. The second time around, however, Overbey was an outspoken proponent, 
noting that expansion was “‘the right thing to do.’”178 After succeeding in the Health and 
Welfare Committee, the bill moved to the rigorous Senate Commerce and Labor Committee.   
 On March 31, 2015, hundreds of expansion advocates singing hymns and donning purple 
“Insure Tennessee Now!” shirts gathered in the committee room to hear Republican Senator 
Doug Overbey present the bill to the Senate Commerce and Labor Committee.179 Overbey 
emphasized, “‘it’s not an expansion to Medicaid…it is a Tennessee approach.”180 The committee 
briefly considered the proposal, and after minimal discussion, rejected the plan by a partisan vote 
of 6-2-1, ending consideration for the legislative year.181  
 This outcome was not unexpected. The Commerce and Labor Committee was predicted 
to be difficult: eight of the Committee’s nine members were Republican. The committee also 
considered Medicaid expansion through an economic lens, and the possibility of Tennessee 
being held responsible for a contentious federal funding plan was daunting. The Lieutenant 
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Governor had previously expressed doubt about the bill’s likelihood of success in committee. In 
his public statement post-vote, Lieutenant Governor Ramsey said: “while I appreciate Gov. 
Haslam's hard work, it is clear that serious questions and concerns regarding Insure Tennessee 
remain. Insure Tennessee was carefully considered and thoroughly examined by no less than four 
Senate committees. Now, it is time to move on.”182 
 Some of the same arguments used to defend rejecting expansion in the first proposal 
reappeared during round two. Justin Owen, President of the Beacon Center of Tennessee, a free-
market think tank, proclaimed that there was no distinction between Insure Tennessee and 
“traditional” Medicaid expansion. AFP, the vocal group that used manpower and scare tactics to 
oppose Haslam’s plan, echoed this distinction. Director Andrew Ogles declared: “‘if you are 
supporting Insure Tennessee…you are supporting Obamacare.’”183  This is the major counter-
frame that Haslam had to account for in his attempts to convince his legislature to pass the 
expansion resolution. Opponents’ mission to merge the schemas surrounding Medicaid and the 
ACA posed an insurmountable challenge for Haslam.  
 In Tennessee, Haslam’s rhetorical frame of Medicaid expansion as a local, homegrown 
solution was less effective than counter-frames connecting expansion to the unpopular ACA. 
Despite voter support for Insure Tennessee, frames put forth by the AFP seemed to resonate with 
lawmakers.184 Lawmakers may have been overwhelmingly preoccupied with their electability, 
and recognized that interest groups, especially well-funded ones like AFP, could easily unseat 
politicians who go against their platform.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182 Sher, “Tennessee Governor’s Medicaid Expansion Plan Fails Again.” 
 
Reid Wilson, “After months of debate, Tennessee Medicaid expansion dies a quick death,” The Washington 
Post, February 5, 2015. 
183 Holly Meyer, “Insure Tennessee debate weighs opposing views,” The Tennessean, October 19, 2015.  
184 Overbey, “Obamacare imperfect, but Insure Tennessee is right for state.” 
59 
Chapter 5 
 Arizona: Incremental Obstinacy 
  
Introduction 
 In this chapter, I narrate the surprising success of Medicaid expansion in Arizona. After 
providing a brief historical overview of Medicaid in Arizona, I describe the forces that motivated 
Republican Governor Jan Brewer to use substantial political capital to implement expansion. In 
Arizona, the absence of re-election pressure freed Brewer to dictate policy choices. Brewer was 
term-limited and her career prospects were not necessarily contingent on her decision-making as 
governor. Although framing did not produce expansion alone, framing may have contributed to a 
sub-set of Republican legislators supporting Medicaid expansion.  
 Among the fifty states in the Union, Arizona falls into the set of states least likely to 
consider expanding Medicaid for its poor residents. For the state-level features that scholars use 
to predict the outcome of Medicaid expansion—political ideology and partisan control—Arizona 
aligns more closely with unsurprising anti-expansion states like Texas, Mississippi, or South 
Carolina.  
 The state voted for the Republican presidential candidate in every election since 1952 
with the exception of Bill Clinton in 1996.185 Republicans generally also have a stronghold at the 
state level. Since the 1980s, only two Democrats were elected to the governor’s seat.186 The state 
legislature reflects this trend:  
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Year 
 
Senate (D) Senate (R) House (D) House (R) Party 
Control 
2009 12 18 25 35 Republican 
2010 12 18 25 35 Republican 
2011 9 21 20 40 Republican 
2012 9 21 20 40 Republican 
2013 13 17 24 36 Republican 
2014 12 
*1 Independent 
17 24 36 Republican 
2015 13 17 24 36 Republican 
            187 
 Arizona is also ground zero for a crucial re-orientation of the Republican Party, started by 
Arizona native Barry Goldwater. In 1960, he published The Conscience of a Conservative, a 
manifesto outlining what would become highly influential conservative positions on education, 
civil rights, taxation, social programs, and the environment. In hopes of cementing these 
preferences into his party’s platform, Goldwater entered the 1964 presidential race. After 
emerging from a highly contentious field to be the GOP nominee, Goldwater’s presidential 
campaign ended in a resounding defeat by Lyndon B. Johnson.188 Goldwater’s loss reinvigorated 
a dormant GOP following a decades-long period of American history where liberalism was the 
favored ideology. Demographic changes that favored the Sunbelt catalyzed a conservative 
movement behind individualism, free enterprise, and fervent anti-communism.189  Republicans 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
187 National Conference of State Legislatures, State Partisan Composition.   
188 Lee Edwards, “Barry M. Goldwater: The Most Consequential Loser in American Politics,” The Heritage 
Foundation, July 3, 2014.  
 
Lyndon B. Johnson won the presidency in 1964 by the largest popular vote margin ever—61% spread 
among 44 states.  
189 Matthew Dallek, “The Conservative 1960s,” The Atlantic, December 1995.  
61 
shifted to a consensus of “favoring government more robust abroad and less ambitious at 
home.”190   
 Goldwater’s writing laid the foundation for concretely putting conservative ideas into 
action.191 His 1964 defeat eventually paid dividends for the Republican Party, particularly during 
the quintessential Ronald Reagan era, and even during George H.W. Bush’s administration. 
Arizona’s historical tradition of establishment conservatism makes the state even less likely to 
expand Medicaid, a social welfare program that Goldwater railed against.   
 Medicaid expansion in Arizona is also unexpected because it is home to the country’s 
most draconian and controversial immigration statute. In April 2010, less than one month after 
the ACA became law, Brewer ratified Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods 
Act, or SB 1070. The bill makes it a state misdemeanor to be in Arizona without proper 
documentation of one’s immigration status. Additionally, it requires that law enforcement 
officials detain individuals they suspect are in the country illegally and verify their legal 
status.192  This law solidified Arizona as one of the toughest states on immigration, and 
suggested that successful social policies tended to be right wing, strict, and traditional.   
 
Historical Overview of Medicaid in Arizona 
 This section will describe Arizona’s Medicaid history, from initial adoption to 
contemporary times. Historical factors like Arizona’s late initial adoption of Medicaid and 
fluctuating funding for Medicaid contributed to an environment in which Medicaid expansion 
would be surprising. Studying expansion in Arizona is especially valuable because it was the last 
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state in the country to adopt Medicaid when it was nationally introduced.193 Rather than embrace 
the national norm of state governments administering healthcare, Arizona’s county governments 
managed that task. Instead of an Arizona-wide Medicaid department, each of the fourteen 
counties had their own distinct program to fund and provide care for the poor. The state 
government prided itself on the fact that such a financially “open-ended” program did not burden 
its budget and policy agenda.194 
 Nearly two decades after Medicaid’s conception, Arizona initiated its Medicaid program, 
called the Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System (AHCCCS), in 1981. Despite holding 
out on Medicaid for so long, the new program was sold as distinct and trailblazing. In line with 
Arizona’s conservative leaning, AHCCCS was introduced under the premise of fiscal 
conservatism and “market-oriented” ideology.  County officials appreciated that the financial 
burden shifted to the state; low-income residents and their advocates felt statewide Medicaid 
would improve access and care quality; the federal government was satisfied that their national 
program was now fully diffused.195 
 Much of the rhetoric at the time of AHCCCS’ creation emphasized how Arizona was able 
to draw on lessons learned from other states’ Medicaid program implementation. Because the 
legislature had repeatedly resisted introducing state-level Medicaid, they had to substantively 
justify their position switch. Their approach was to present AHCCCS as a culmination of “best-
practice” techniques gleaned from other states’ experiments with Medicaid. Program objectives 
emphasized fiscal responsibility and administrative efficiency. Features like the focus on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
193 Charles Brecher, “Medicaid comes to Arizona: A first-year report on AHCCCS,” Journal of Health Politics, 
Policy and Law, Vol. 19 (3), 1984, Page 411.  
194 Brecher, “Medicaid comes to Arizona: A first-year report on AHCCCS,” Pages 411, 412, 414. 
Today, there are 15 counties in the state. 
Open-ended meaning that there was no way to predict the actual cost of Medicaid per year because anyone 
who is eligible can receive benefits and the federal/state governments must foot the bill.   
195 Ibid., Pages 415 and 424.  
63 
capitation and cost-competition, outsourcing to private firms for administrative tasks, and the 
high proportion of local funding demonstrate this.196  
 Despite its delayed enactment, AHCCCS was still susceptible to many of the same 
challenges that obstructed Medicaid in other parts of the country. The program had barely 
entrenched itself when budgetary problems emerged: county revenue dwindled, pressuring 
hospitals around Arizona to impose cutbacks wherever possible. Revenue uncertainty combined 
with an 88% cost increase from 1983 to 1984 put the state in a tenuous situation.197 Throughout 
the 1990s, Arizona’s Medicaid program was consistently ranked in the “bottom-of-the-barrel” 
for per capita funding and quality of services.198 Despite these concerns, over the next few years, 
eligibility requirements expanded to include low-income children, pregnant women, and 
developmentally disabled individuals.199  This first cascade of expansion intensified in 2000, 
when 63% of voters passed Proposition 204, which expanded Medicaid coverage to individuals 
earning up to 100% FPL.200 A previous settlement with tobacco companies covered the cost of 
expansion, which targeted around 50,000 childless adults who had been excluded from care.201 
This politically contentious population would become especially critical in the post-ACA 
climate.  
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Budget vs. Bodies: Arizona Medicaid Pre-Sebelius  
 Jan Brewer arrived on Arizona’s political scene in 1982, when she was elected to the 
state’s House of Representatives. Her civil service continued in the state Senate and on the 
Maricopa County Board of Supervisors. Although she never graduated from college, Brewer’s 
experience owning and operating small businesses made her a formidable Republican 
candidate.202 
 Just a year into President Obama’s first presidential term, as healthcare was moving into 
the national limelight, Brewer accelerated her political stature through an unusual political 
practice. Arizona does not have a Lieutenant Governor position, so the Secretary of State takes 
over if the governorship becomes open. When Obama tapped Janet Napolitano for Secretary of 
Homeland Security in 2009, Brewer, as Secretary of State, was next in line. Upon assuming 
office, Brewer’s agenda focused on downsizing government to remedy a $4 billion deficit. 
Brewer promised her constituents a more competitive, sustainable Arizona. Within a year of 
assuming office, Brewer and her administration were preoccupied with three complex and 
formidable policy conundrums: a statewide financial crisis, national health care reform, and 
immigration reform.203  
 The state felt the downstream effects of the 2008 financial crisis in a very real way. 
Arizona is twice as dependent on construction revenue than the nation as a whole, so the 2008 
housing bubble stifled that source of revenue.204 The response from Republican officials, who in 
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2011 had a 21-9 Senate majority and a 40-20 House majority, was to cut the education and 
healthcare budgets, reduce new debt issuances, and halt the creation of new taxes.205  
 Arizona had to grapple with the more immediate challenge of alleviating a financial crisis 
before tackling the mandates laid out in the ACA. For fiscal year 2012, the upside of the two-
year budget projection was a $67 million deficit (meaning, by 2014, Arizona would be in a $67 
million hole); the downside was a $583 million shortfall.206 2010 revenues were at 2004 levels, 
but expenditures were 30% higher.207 Arizona’s annual budget must balance, so Brewer’s 
administration was faced with the daunting challenge of conforming to conservatism while 
raising enough cash to reduce debt.208 
 The budget included cuts to the Department of Health Services, the Department of 
Economic Security, and the Department of Housing.209 But most of the cuts in the 2011 proposal, 
for fiscal year 2012-2013, came from the fast growing program, AHCCCS, which occupied 
about a fifth of the entire budget.210 The governor suggested the following means to reduce 
Medicaid expenditures: withdraw General Fund support for the program, and instead rely solely 
on litigation funds, thereby eliminating coverage for childless adults; reduce the provider rate by 
5%; and tighten eligibility requirements for parents.211  
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 The Arizona legislature reduced funding for the Medicaid program, AHCCCS, by over 
$500 million—about half of the total cuts.212 Consequently, childless adults could no longer 
apply for benefits; only those already enrolled on the books would receive coverage.213 This 
reduction affected over 150,000 Medicaid recipients in the first year.214 In 2011, 18% of the state 
population was on AHCCCS coverage, but the same percentage was uninsured.215 Arizona faced 
an all-too-familiar cycle of budget cuts that led to rising healthcare costs, which in turn furthered 
budget pressure. 
 It is important to note that Brewer’s 2011 budget proposal was formulated before the 
Sebelius decision—she was operating under the belief that Medicaid expansion was a federal 
mandate. Brewer restructured her state’s expenditures to accommodate what she called the 
federal government’s usurpation of fiscal decision-making, via required Medicaid expansion.216 
In other words, Brewer saw the ACA’s Medicaid mandate as a loss of state authority, and 
pursued cost control methods to compensate for expanded eligibility.  
 Although the statewide focus was on balancing the budget, Brewer also devoted 
administrative attention to the ACA. In her 2010 State of the State speeches, Brewer addressed 
the “oppressive” nature of the ACA and told Arizonians “there is no such thing as free health 
care.” She called on her state to take control of their health care fate as individuals: “the federal 
government may be failing in its role [to supply affordable healthcare], but we will continue to 
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do better in ours.”217 Under Brewer’s leadership, Arizona joined Florida vs. HHS, a 26-state 
lawsuit that challenged the constitutionality of ACA (particularly the individual mandate) in the 
Supreme Court.218 Arizona was a one of the earliest states to sign onto the national lawsuit, doing 
so two weeks after the ACA was ratified. Arizona’s Attorney General declined to join the 
lawsuit, but Brewer called a special legislative session to get permission to take part in the 
litigation.219  In a 2010 press release, Brewer described the ACA as “unreasonable, unsustainable 
and unconstitutional” and an “unprecedented intrusion” on state sovereignty.220 Noting that the 
lawsuit would only cost Arizona around $5,000, Brewer emphasized Arizona’s responsibility to 
uphold federalism and constrain this governmental overreach.221 Her outspoken position on the 
ACA—this statement was published six months after the ACA’s passage—cemented her as a 
staunch health reform opponent, making her eventual pursuit of expansion all the more puzzling.  
 Brewer’s ideological switch from vehement opposition of the ACA to steadfast support 
of Medicaid is a constraint on framing. She needed an approach that was flexible enough to 
make it appear that she was not contradicting her previous commitment. The frame for Medicaid 
expansion had to be consistent with her rejection of the ACA. The ACA was highly partisan and 
many Republicans outright opposed all of its reforms. So when a Republican-governed state 
faced the choice of Medicaid expansion, the conservative leadership had to recognize and 	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rationalize their earlier dismissal. Governor Brewer was no exception. In order to appropriately 
acknowledge her historical stance on the ACA, Brewer employed a humanistic frame. She 
asserted that “’although I didn’t support Obamacare, I support taking care of the poor.”222  
 Amidst the ACA and a fiscal crunch was Arizona’s immigration reform, which garnered 
national attention—even condemnation from the President, who rarely opines about state laws.  
 Did the issue of illegal immigration intersect with Medicaid expansion? Preconceived 
notions about undocumented immigrants and provision of healthcare swirled: contrary to many 
assumptions, 78% of uninsured Americans are citizens, and immigrants are 35% less likely to 
visit an emergency room than non-immigrants.223 Also, proponents of SB 1070 pointed to saved 
dollars from illegal immigrants leaving Arizona as a result of the bill—the state would then no 
longer have to pay for healthcare. However, the actual monetary effect of that population’s 
departure is unclear.224  These conjectures would suggest that expansion would be even more 
unlikely because expansion would permit more illegal immigrants to use scarce state funds. 
 A nuanced ACA provision added another layer of complexity to the provision of 
healthcare to the low-income. Under the ACA, a U.S. citizen must live above the poverty line to 
qualify for federal subsidies for private health insurance. However, regardless of income, all 
legal residents (who are not yet full citizens) are eligible for subsidies for private insurance. Once 
Medicaid expansion became optional, immigration status became much more relevant. If a state 
opts out of expansion, none of its American citizens below the poverty line can receive subsidies 
for Medicaid or private insurance. However, legal residents would be eligible for private 
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subsidies.225  This technicality presented an additional tactical choice for Brewer. Would she 
renege on SB 1070 by refusing Medicaid expansion, or take on Republicans and protect Arizona 
citizens by expanding Medicaid?  
 
Opening the Expansion Door 
 Less than six months after the Supreme Court’s ruling, Brewer announced the expansion 
plan to provide health coverage for individuals earning up to 138% FPL in her 2013 State of the 
State address.226 In the version of her address disseminated early to lawmakers and the press, 
there was no mention of Medicaid expansion—Brewer went off script when she announced 
expansion.227 
 In her 2013 State of the State address, which began the pursuit of Medicaid expansion, 
Brewer reminded Arizonians that they had supported Medicaid expansion in the past.228 First, in 
2000, voters authorized Prop 204, an expansion of Medicaid eligibility to 100% FPL, similar to 
the initiative on the table.229 Second, Arizonians also voted in favor of a provider assessment, or 
a charge on a healthcare provider to pay for newly eligible recipients, on nursing homes.230 This 
is similar to how Brewer’s expansion is paid for—via an assessment on hospitals. Brewer used a 
policy precedence frame in order to make voters, and indirectly, lawmakers more comfortable 
with expansion. 
 Brewer used these historical mandates to frame expansion as consistent and familiar. A 
positive decision on Medicaid would fit with how Arizona had voted before. The strength of this 	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particular framing strategy is that it addresses a universal voter concern that change is daunting 
and unfamiliar—and thus, bad.231 Voters are consistently more likely to favor the status quo than 
a reform package because of the uncertainty associated with the distribution of gains and losses 
from a new policy. Thus, language like “restorative” or re-installment is more palatable than an 
untested reform.232 Framing expansion as consistent with past policies would also make counter-
frames less salient. A counter-frame that emphasized how Brewer’s expansion was an innovative 
or unprecedented reform would be invalid because Arizonians had twice passed similar 
expansion measures.  
 The governor’s proposal would make around 400,000 more people eligible for Medicaid. 
In anticipation of backlash regarding the federal fund-matching scheme, the plan also included 
an automatic rollback on enrollment in the event of a federal funding drop.233 With this “circuit 
breaker,” Brewer protected her proposal from a nationwide argument that the national 
government would renege on their promise to cover the newly eligible population. Other 
expansion-minded states like Iowa, Nevada and Arkansas also included a rollback in the event of 
a federal “cut and run” in their expansion plans.234 The strategy was even backed by former 
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Health and Humans Services Secretary Kathleen Sebelius, who emphasized to governors that 
there would be no penalty on traditional Medicaid if a state rolled back expansion.235  
 Brewer’s choice to bundle expansion into the Arizona state budget for 2013 was designed 
to increase expansion’s traction. Senate Majority Whip Adam Driggs explained that because the 
budget is broad in terms of policy changes, there is some “political cover” for voting in favor of 
a budget including expansion. In other words, a representative is not voting only on Medicaid 
when he votes for the budget, potentially softening the political blow. Another argument in favor 
of embedment is that a standalone bill for Medicaid is far easier for an array of stakeholders to 
target and dissect, and thus far more likely to fail.236 
 From January to May, Brewer held special public events around the state to get citizens 
on board with her policy. Two weeks after Brewer announced her policy plan, over 14 business 
and healthcare organizations announced their support for expansion at a small event.237 A rally in 
early March attracted medical professionals donning white coats, with a handful of protestors in 
all black. At the event, which took place outside the Capitol building, the President of the 
Arizona Medical Association declared: Medicaid is “‘not a ‘red issue’ or a ‘blue issue’ to 
doctors. It is a patient-care, humanitarian issue.’”238 Overall, more formal organizations were in 
attendance at these events than the average citizen. Some groups were previously allied with 
Brewer, but others emerged in support of expansion because of new fiscal challenges and the 
possibility that without expansion, their business would be affected.   
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 At these events, Brewer focused on the humanitarian aspects of Medicaid expansion. 
Noting that those who lost coverage would have no alternative means of healthcare, Brewer 
announced, “‘the human cost of this tragedy can’t be calculated.’” 239 At the last and largest 
rally, Brewer reminded a 200-person crowd of health care providers, patients, and other 
stakeholders: “‘ [expansion is] the right thing to do.’”240 While these events did not pre-empt 
vigorous legislative debate, they achieved their purpose of offering forums for discussion.  
 Brewer’s grassroots efforts seemed to increase the proposal’s public salience. Polling 
numbers showed a gradual warming to Medicaid expansion. In April, Public Opinion Strategies, 
a national polling firm, conducted a survey in which 45% of respondents favored Medicaid 
expansion, and 25% opposed it.241 The remainder of those polled indicated they had not heard of 
Brewer’s plan.242 By late May, three weeks before the legislature considered expansion, a poll by 
the same organization found that 53% of respondents supported Brewer’s proposal.243  
 By holding attention-getting public events, Brewer behaved analogous to the presidential 
strategy of “Going Public,” or directly appealing to American voters in order to pressure 
Congress into passing legislation rather than bargain with them. The “Going Public” theory notes 
that the strategy works better for outsider leaders—Brewer can be classified this way, as she is 
not an establishment conservative—and for politicians with little to lose in the short run—
Brewer was term-limited, and was not pursuing another elected position after her tenure.244 
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 The governor’s true audience at these events was the elected officials representing the 
individuals in attendance. In line with the stipulations of “Going Public,” Brewer was hoping to 
increase public support such that elected officials would face political consequences if they 
opposed Brewer. Public support should have encouraged Republican officials to consider 
expansion—they would not only have the governor’s endorsement, but they would be 
implementing a policy that the majority of voters were in favor of.245 
 Despite the public support scale sliding in the direction of expansion, critics noted that 
the wording of Brewer’s Medicaid plan in polls was misinformed, potentially altering how 
people polled. One interest group said that the description of the expansion proposal was 
“generally positive,” and did not adequately explain the circuit-breaker provision. According to 
the poll’s critics, these factors presented a more favorable policy than expansion actually was.246 
This debate demonstrates the explanation posited in the literature: that framing via rhetorical 
choice can alter public support.  
 Regardless of voter sentiment, Brewer’s opposition was vocal and well organized. In the 
early stages of Brewer’s announcement, Republican representative Carl Seel delivered near daily 
speeches on the House floor stating why officials should oppose expansion. He was concerned 
about the lack of information about Medicaid expansion and the uncertainty surrounding the 
federal government’s financing of expansion.247 Republican Senate President and libertarian 
Andy Biggs said he thought there were “a million and one reasons” expansion was a bad idea.248 
Biggs, a millionaire by lottery victory, previously served eight years in the state House and 
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chaired the House Appropriations Committee. He believed that Medicaid was socialized 
medicine and had sponsored a failed attempt in 2010 to eliminate the program entirely.249 
 On April 25th, 2013, an anti-expansion rally organized by a freshman Republican 
garnered the attendance and attention of dozens of Republican lawmakers as well as citizens 
opposed to Brewer’s plan. The protest featured two skeletons labeled with a “victims of 
Obamacare” sign in front of the Arizona house.250 The majority of the opposition’s message 
centered on the possible political repercussions of opposition: would incumbency be threatened? 
The answer to their concerns was yes. A.J. LaFaro, the Chairman of the Maricopa County 
Republican Committee, wrote a letter warning Republicans that voting for expansion was an 
“egregious action” with “serious consequences…their political careers are all but over and their 
days numbered.”251  
 By June 2013, the climate in both the desert and the legislature was boiling. According to 
Arizona’s constitution, the deadline for a budget—and for expansion—was July 1. After 
threatening to block bills if the legislature did not make progress on the budget, Brewer upped 
the ante and announced a moratorium on all laws until Medicaid expansion was passed. She was 
good on her word, vetoing five bills before expansion moved forward.252 Amidst stalling efforts 
by House Republicans, Brewer called a surprise special legislative session without formal 
permission from her fellow Republicans.253 In Arizona, governors are able to convene these 
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sessions—as many as they deem appropriate—to direct the focus of the legislature.254 Governors 
must announce the intention of the session, and have to stick to that topic.255 Brewer’s abrupt 
move was anchored by a bipartisan coalition that formed months before the vote to consider 
other issues in the budget. In a vote that took place at 4am, the House approved the budget, 
including Medicaid expansion, by a 33-27 margin.256 The coalition was a crucial voting bloc. 
 In the House, the Medicaid expansion proposal attracted a positive vote from nine out of 
the 36 Republicans in addition to the 24-member Democratic contingent that needed little 
convincing to support the plan.257 Many of the Republican representatives who failed to do what 
their legislative leaders demanded had GOP opponents in the next election. Likely in anticipation 
of Republican backlash, the governor and health care industry allies raised nearly half a million 
dollars for the Republican endorsers’ future campaigns leading up to the vote.258 Republicans 
who supported Medicaid expansion might be in trouble when they ran for re-election. If their 
challenger were a more traditional Republican who saw Medicaid as a Democratic Party issue, or 
as an example of Brewer betraying party platform, the representative would then have to justify 
his ideologically inconsistent vote to his constituents.  
 The Senate followed the House’s example, and approved the budget by a 19-11 vote. 
Five Republican senators joined the unanimous Democratic vote.259 The funding guaranteed that 
Arizona’s population earning up to 138% FPL would receive healthcare coverage.  
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 Brewer’s method to implement expansion can be described as incremental obstinacy. 
When it first appeared that the legislature was not receptive to expansion, Brewer played 
hardball. She stated she would veto any budget that did not include the expansion component. 
When that moratorium approach failed, she threatened to veto all bills the legislature proposed 
until Medicaid was expanded.260 Instead of accepting defeat or circumventing the traditional 
legislative process, Brewer gradually asserted her legislative capital. This approach was 
unprecedented; no other Republican governors used such aggressive tactics to try to push 
expansion through. There are a number of reasons this strategy was effective in Arizona. Brewer 
did not have the weight of future political roles moderating her decision-making. She was term-
limited, did not have long-term political aspirations, and was not a central GOP figure. Unlike 
aspiring president John Kasich, Brewer’s did not need to make decisions that would eventually 
be defended by Republicans. Without party pressure she could act independently.   
 
Brewer’s Battle 
 Shortly after the legislature approved the budget, the question of expansion spilled into 
judicial territory. The plaintiff, the Goldwater Institute, contended that Brewer violated Arizona’s 
constitution because the hospital assessment that helps to cover the costs of expansion can be 
viewed as a tax. Taxes must have the two-thirds of the legislature’s support; Medicaid expansion 
passed with a simple majority.261 
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 The case originated in February 2014, with the backing of over 30 Republican 
lawmakers—out of the 53 Republicans in the 2014 General Assembly—but was dismissed by a 
state Supreme Court judge. That decision was later overturned, and the case moved forward, 
putting expansion in jeopardy. Ultimately, the court ruled in favor of Brewer and AHCCCS, 
confirming expansion’s legality.262 The ruling was a victory for expansion proponents including 
Brewer, but of greater concern was the upcoming 2014 gubernatorial election. If the policy could 
be reversed or challenged easily, then it would be unsafe depending on who controlled Arizona’s 
government. Brewer did not mention Medicaid in her parting remarks as governor. 
 Medicaid was top-of-mind during the gubernatorial race. Former Arizona State Treasurer 
Doug Ducey emerged from a six candidate Republican primary and ran against the unopposed 
Democrat, Fred DuVal. The lone Democrat supported expansion and vowed to reject proposals 
to eliminate the reform. DuVal’s position was unsurprising. He had been a critical player in 
AHCCCS’s creation in the 1980’s.263 DuVal “applaud[ed]” Medicaid expansion and would keep 
the expansion in its full form as governor. 264 DuVal called expansion a “national best practice” 
that is “good for [the] budget [and] good for Arizonans.”265 The Republican primary candidates 
had a spectrum of opinions on expansion. “Go Daddy” executive Christine Jones, Ducey’s only 
significant contender, was tepid on expansion, and stated that she would have included cost-
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containment mechanisms and eligibility limits in her expansion plan.266 Ducey’s position was 
clear: Medicaid was a “middle class entitlement.”267 When Ducey won the Republican 
nomination, the two general election candidates diverged on their Medicaid expansion policy 
preferences.   
 After winning the election with 53% of the vote, Tea Party-backed Ducey tempered his 
stance towards Medicaid. He said he would veto any bills repealing expansion so long as federal 
funding remained in place. At the same time, he began drafting reforms to cut Medicaid 
expansion. In the first year he took office, Ducey announced a Medicaid modernization plan 
under the name “AHCCCS Care.” At the helm of Ducey’s health care team was the Goldwater 
Institute’s Christina Corieri, who had a part in the lawsuit that unsuccessfully tried to reverse 
expansion. Ducey’s plan included three structural changes. First, Arizona Medicaid would have a 
five-year lifetime limit for able-bodied adults. Second, the plan introduced copays, which are 
patient payments made for services above a certain cost threshold, the rest of which is covered 
by insurance (or in this case, the Medicaid fund). Third, the nearly 400,000 able-bodied adults 
receiving coverage must be actively searching for employment or involved in job training or 
school in order to receive Medicaid.268 Adult Medicaid recipients would also be expected to 
make a contribution in the amount of 2% of their annual household income to a health savings 
account. That account could only be accessed if the individual engaged in healthy behaviors like 
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annual check ups or taking classes on how to smoking cessation.269 The common theme 
throughout the proposal is individual responsibility—a conservative principle, according to 
Ducey—and reduced government involvement.270  
 None of these changes have been formalized; however, the General Assembly approved a 
waiver including these changes for Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) approval 
in February 2015. Ducey is somewhat at the mercy of CMS, who have yet to approve these 
reforms. When other states proposed similar reforms to Medicaid, CMS accepted some of the 
changes, like the health savings account component, which exists today in Arkansas, Indiana, 
and Michigan. However, work requirements and lifetime eligibility limits are unprecedented—
CMS has never allowed them. 271 The future of Medicaid expansion in Arizona remains up in the 
air, but if Ducey proceeds with reforming the policy, he will have to re-frame Medicaid 
expansion.    
 Arizona is the only case where expansion passed by traditional legislative means, with 
both the House and Senate’s approval. Several factors helped Brewer’s case. Previous votes in 
favor of Medicaid were in recent memory, and this frame gave Republicans who could be 
convinced two solid reasons why they now supported this expansion proposal. Also, the fact that 
expansion was folded into the state budget made it more difficult for Republican opponents to 
obstruct the plan since they would be responsible for delaying funding across the state. Brewer’s 
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The goal of a health savings account is to establish a safety net for Medicaid recipients to use in the event 
of an emergency. The balance can also be used towards copays for health services that Medicaid does not 
cover (dental or vision care are two common Medicaid service gaps). Medicaid recipients who earn above 
the poverty level and did not make an annual health savings account could be removed from the Medicaid 
rolls for 6 months. If a recipient earns less than FPL, they would owe the state that debt.  
270 Ducey’s ideas tie back to the fundamental tension between healthcare as a public good, provided universally (or 
even partially) by government, or an entirely private commodity, distributed via employer or private companies. 
These two opposing ideas are the most basic distinction between how Democrats and Republicans view healthcare.  
271 Ollove, “Should Medicaid Recipients Have to Work?”  
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frames of policy precedence and economic advantage, in conjunction with other political forces, 
converted the subset of Republican lawmakers who ultimately supported expansion.  Framing 
can matter even if it only altered the votes of that division of the opponent contingent. In 
Arizona, framing was not a central cause of expansion’s success, but it remains especially 
relevant post-Brewer, because her successor has vowed to reverse Medicaid expansion.  
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Chapter 6 
Cross Case Comparison 
 
 This chapter serves two purposes. First, it reviews my key findings and compares framing 
strategies from the three cases. Second, it contextualizes framing in the state-level policymaking 
process. How does framing interact with social welfare policies like Medicaid expansion? In 
what ways do framing strategies shift over the lifespan of a policy? Framing played a modest 
role in the Medicaid expansion outcomes in Ohio, Tennessee, and Arizona. Framing alone may 
not be helpful for predicting policy outcomes, but it is relevant for understanding how Medicaid 
expansion politics transpire after their initial implementation.  
 Each of the three narratives explored in the preceding chapters offers a differently tinted 
lens for understanding the environments in which Medicaid expansion was considered. The 
following analysis recaps my account of the politics of Medicaid expansion in Ohio, Tennessee, 
and Arizona.  
 In order to appeal to persuadable Republicans—who initially opposed but could 
potentially support expansion—Governor Kasich used moral and economic frames. Religion, 
“doing the right thing,” and helping the less fortunate fit into a certain Republican schema of 
social policy—“Compassionate Conservatism.” This political philosophy is useful for 
Republican politicians to both publicly support social services without promoting or authorizing 
government resources to do so.272 
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 Associating morality with Medicaid expansion altered the program’s associations with 
President Obama and federal government intervention. However, Kasich’s opponents, 
Republicans in the legislature, were concerned with Medicaid expansion’s association with the 
ACA and the uncertainty of federal funding. This paralyzed the Ohio legislature and forced 
Kasich to change strategies and to authorize Medicaid expansion via a special political body, the 
Controlling Board. Kasich’s framing of expansion as a moral imperative failed to convince the 
necessary lawmakers to budge on expansion. Although framing did not accelerate the initial 
authorization of expansion, the emotional aspects of Kasich’s moral frames will make undoing 
expansion challenging. Counter-frames will have to account for Kasich’s connection of 
expansion with righteousness and religious obligation. Each of Kasich’s frames had the 
additional benefit of bolstering his legacy as a moderate policymaker who could survive vetting 
at the national level. With presidential aspirations in the background of Kasich’s governorship, 
each maneuver associated with Medicaid expansion had to fit into a narrative of prudent 
budgetary leadership, which includes healthcare.  
 Governor Haslam framed Medicaid expansion in Tennessee as a budget-neutral, 
homegrown policy that would improve TennCare, the existing but troubled Medicaid 
administrative body. The governor created a rhetorical distinction between the ACA and 
Medicaid as well as between the new expansion and past Medicaid policies. These strategies 
were necessary to contend with counter-frames, which linked expansion and the failed Medicaid 
program, TennCare. Other counter-frames connected Medicaid expansion and Obama’s health 
reform, which was wildly unpopular among Tennesseans.  
 Although Haslam’s framing selections were successful when deployed by Medicaid 
expansion proponents in other states, they proved inadequate in Tennessee. State-specific factors 
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weakened the effectiveness of the Insure Tennessee expansion proposal. A toxic combination of 
federal government mistrust, re-election pressures, and partisan posturing doomed expansion 
multiple times. Governor Haslam was unable to answer counter-frames from Tea Party groups, 
which portrayed Medicaid expansion as sympathetic to the ACA, and which discussed expansion 
in ways meant to stoke white racial resentment.273 Despite consistent framing—Arizona and 
Ohio’s governors used similar strategies—other political forces mitigated Haslam’s appeals.  
 Governor Brewer’s approach to Medicaid expansion in Arizona can be described as 
incremental obstinacy. Brewer was at an advantage because she was term-limited and free from 
Republican Party norms, and thus able to leverage more political capital in order to pursue 
expansion. By presenting Medicaid expansion using two specific frames: 1) policy precedence 
and 2) easing of fiscal burden, the governor cornered her legislature into responding to 
constituent support and gubernatorial pleas. In a historically conservative state controlled by a 
conservative legislature, Brewer had to make a strong economic case for Medicaid expansion 
and accommodate concerns about federal-level uncertainty into her bill. But to cement the bill 
with skeptic lawmakers, Brewer tied this Medicaid expansion to two previous policies. This 
strategy served to convince Arizonians, and indirectly, Republican lawmakers that Medicaid 
expansion today was native to Arizona soil. In other words, expansion was not a policy 
prescription sent from bureaucrats in Washington. Brewer also adequately acknowledged her 
opponent’s rebuttals, categorically rejecting the notion that Medicaid expansion was an embrace 
of Obamacare. Although Brewer saw expansion through, framing likely was a small contributor 
to the small group of Republican lawmakers who supported expansion.  
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Cross Case Analysis 
 Here, I directly compare framing in the Ohio, Tennessee, and Arizona cases. I will point 
out the shared characteristics among the three cases, the common framing strategies employed 
across the cases, and the magnitude of framing in these states. 
 Four common characteristics influenced the content and distribution of frames across 
these cases. First, the governors of Ohio, Tennessee, and Arizona were anti-ACA. Gubernatorial 
opposition was of course expected—indeed, no Republican federal lawmakers voted in favor of 
the ACA. Was such opposition sincere or strategic? We might anticipate the rejection of the 
ACA as the expectation for loyal partisans. Governors do not want to be the party outlier, so 
instead follow the heed of Republican politicians in the public eye. Kasich’s presidential 
campaign website promotes a “repeal and replace” approach to the ACA.274  Kasich also 
declared: “From Day One, and up until today [2014] and into tomorrow, I do not support 
Obamacare…I believe it should be repealed.”275 Brewer eagerly signed Arizona onto a lawsuit 
challenging the ACA’s constitutionality. The mantra of “repeal and replace” was ubiquitous in 
the GOP. Haslam issued the following statement after NFIB vs. Sebelius: “By electing Mitt 
Romney, we can be sure that the entire [ACA] will be repealed.”276 If we consider these 
governors’ public statements at face value, it is unlikely that Brewer, Kasich, and Haslam were 
fundamentally and genuinely opposed to the ACA reforms. Rather, party pressures restricted 
their preference latitude. Strict partisan support for the ACA created a challenge for Republican 
governors who eventually sought to expand Medicaid. 
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 Second, each governor made substantive rhetorical distinctions between the ACA and 
Medicaid. This is an important empirical specification. There is an informational inconsistency 
in seeking to repeal the ACA while supporting Medicaid expansion. This expansion opportunity 
would not have existed—at least, not in the same form—if the ACA were dismantled. Although 
Medicaid expansion is always a policy option, the ACA introduced supplemental benefits that 
made expansion fiscally attractive. An ACA repeal would likely change the main incentive for 
expansion, an unprecedented generous financing scheme. As a result, Republican or Republican-
leaning states would be less enticed to expand Medicaid. However, it seemed that governors 
were more willing to reform Medicaid if they successfully framed it as a stand-alone program. 
Tennessee’s Haslam, for example, artfully demonstrated this rhetorical strategy when he 
distinguished between “traditional” Medicaid expansion and his proposal, called Insure 
Tennessee.277 Insure Tennessee was slightly modified from the expansion laid out in the ACA, 
but Haslam was able publicly cut ties with the unpopular ACA. This strategy was used in 
Michigan as well; Governor Rick Snyder’s Healthy Michigan plan is identical to ACA Medicaid 
expansion, but does not carry the connotations of the term “Medicaid” or “Medicaid 
expansion.”278  
 Third, the GOP had been in control of the Ohio, Tennessee, and Arizona legislature since 
the ACA passed. None of the states studied here had divided government when expansion 
became a state choice after NFIB vs. Sebelius. This fact made expansion all the more challenging 
for governors to achieve.  
 A fourth common trait shared by Ohio, Tennessee, and Arizona is that in none did a 
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Brewer in Arizona to implement Medicaid expansion successfully, they needed some 
Republicans to join already supportive Democrats to pass expansion. This suggests that there is a 
specific audience for framing. Even before Ohio, Arizona, and Tennessee’s governors came out 
with a stance on expansion, they would face an uphill battle against an already defiant GOP 
legislature.279  
 Governors have many choices regarding whom to direct political comments towards: 
voters, elected officials, or interest groups. For expansion-minded governors, framing could be 
used as a heuristic to enact public policy that was at odds with the interests of at least one of 
these groups. Framing emerges during “pivot points,” or narrow windows of opportunity for 
expansion. Each proposal, committee meeting, and revision of expansion amounted to a pivot or 
inflection point that allowed the governor to deploy certain frames. These fleeting opportunities, 
however, had an intended audience. Since Democratic lawmakers already supported expansion, 
governors did not need to “spin” expansion to gain their votes. Since Republican lawmakers 
opposed expansion for partisan (among other) reasons, governors sought to incentivize them to 
betray their party. The most effective strategy for governors was to choose frames that would 
appeal to Republican voters in Republican districts. Research indicates that partisans tend to 
communicate only with other co-partisans, because their messages are more likely to be 
received. 280 The interests and motivations of this narrow population informed which kind of 
appeals governors used in their frames. The next portion of my analysis focuses on what framing 
strategies the governors of Ohio, Tennessee, and Arizona and used. 
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Ohio and Arizona: Morals  
 In both Ohio and Arizona, Governors Kasich and Brewer invoked religious appeals. 
Justifying policy positions with reference to religion is nothing new. Kasich and Brewer 
exploited a puzzling and still-unexplained trend of higher-than-expected white American 
working class support for Republican office-seekers who usually promote policies out of step 
with these voters’ material interests.281  White working class Americans, the people who would 
most benefit from Medicaid expansion, resisted the policy. Governors tried to combat this by 
making religion-inflected appeals.  
 White working class Republican voters’ inconsistency presents a conundrum for politics 
and policy outcomes. Scholars have suggested that perhaps working-class Republicans are 
misinformed about the policies they are supporting, and with more information, would vote 
differently.282 Other research concludes that economic policies get “bundled” with divisive issues 
like abortion or gay marriage, which distorts voter preference.283 Another predominant 
explanation is that voters vote in this surprising way because they prefer the moral values of the 
GOP despite disliking the economic policies themselves.284 All these possible voter biases mean 
that framing Medicaid expansion as a moral or Christian obligation could influence the intended 
audience of framing—Republican voters in Republican districts—enough to give their 
Republican lawmakers a reason to support expansion. 	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 Kasich’s linkage of Medicaid expansion with Christian values comported with his 
reputation as a compassionate conservative.285 Research on moral values and politics supports 
the notion that moral values “act as motivational guides” for leaders to justify particular 
actions.286 In Arizona, Brewer had to contend with religious rebuttals against her decision to 
pursue Medicaid expansion. Brewer’s opponents challenged her religious integrity to undermine 
support for Medicaid expansion. According to Arizona Republican House Appropriations 
Committee Vice Chair Justin Olson, “‘there’s a distinction between what Jesus did and lobbying 
Caesar.’”287 Maricopa County (Arizona) Republican Party Chairman A.J. LaFaro proclaimed: 
“‘Jesus had Judas. Republicans have Gov. Brewer.’”288 These comments served to make 
Republican voters question Brewer’s loyalty to her faith and made her actions seem morally—
even theologically—questionable.  
 The hypothesis that moral appeals cloud policy preference is compelling, but does not 
support the evidence discussed here. Moral appeals may be effective, but for Medicaid expansion 
policy, morality was not reason enough for voters in Republican districts to sway their elected 
officials. Working class voters should support politicians whose policies hurt them because those 
leaders are seen as supporting bills with Christian morals. However, in Arizona and Ohio, where 
the governors engaged with moral frames, very few Republican lawmakers were won over by 
their constituents’ preferences. Doing “the Christian thing” may boost the governor’s 
reputations, but was not a significant force in persuading Republican voters’ minds. 
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Tennessee and Arizona: Medicaid Policy Heritage   
 In Arizona and Tennessee, governors framed Medicaid expansion as a continuation of 
their state’s existing legacy of Medicaid. This “heritage” frame urged voters to consider 
Medicaid expansion in a historical and indigenous context. Governor Brewer spun the strengths 
and politics of her states’ Medicaid program to assure voters that additional Medicaid expansion 
comported with their past voting record, which had favored other expansion-like initiatives. Two 
prior voter referendums set the precedent for favoring Medicaid expansion. Brewer also urged 
voters to be proud of Arizona’s Medicaid program.289 She portrayed AHCCCS as having 
successfully addressed cost-control concerns by exploiting private insurance and adhering to 
free-market principles. This programmatic legacy evolved from a sense of entrepreneurship early 
in the lifespan of Arizona Medicaid. In Tennessee, Haslam suggested that Medicaid expansion 
could begin to correct some of TennCare’s administrative and financial deficiencies, and restore 
the program to its original capacity. TennCare had been innovative and trailblazing when it was 
first created, but administrative mismanagement and insufficient budgeting led to TennCare’s 
downward spiral despite the promise of improvement.  
 It is highly unlikely that framing Medicaid expansion as familiar, indigenous policy is a 
pivotal reason why expansion passed in Arizona or why it failed in Tennessee. However, the fact 
that both governors used overlapping frames suggests that there are common arguments that 
elected officials recognize to be valuable and salient appeals. 
 
 Did Framing Matter?  
 Considering the diverse political environments and the breadth of frames used in Ohio, 
Tennessee, and Arizona, how much did framing matter in the outcome of expansion? Broadly, 	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framing made a modest impact on Medicaid expansion in these states. Framing would be a 
significant factor for expansion if the governors changed the way that Republican voters in 
Republican districts perceived Medicaid. However, Arizona was the only state studied where the 
legislature was on board with expansion. Framing may have changed public perception of 
expansion—making it appear highly partisan, contentious, and dramatic—but framing did not 
alter outcomes positively. Although governors may not have achieved their desired outcome, 
framing still matters. Perhaps interest group framing overpowered the individual governors’ 
frames, or elite framing confirmed Republican lawmakers’ hesitation on expansion. Framing is 
still important even if it does not produce positive outcomes. 
 In Ohio, despite Kasich’s moral frames, the legislature held fast, forcing the governor to 
bypass traditional policymaking and use the Controlling Board. Kasich failed to make the 
religious aspects of expansion resonate with Republican voters in Republican districts to such a 
degree that Republican voters pressured their representatives to change their position. Instead, 
framing served to rationalize his use of the highly controversial Controlling Board because 
Kasich’s expansion frames fit with his political reputation. 
 In Tennessee, Haslam’s frame of Tennessee-bred Medicaid expansion proved 
unsuccessful. The unraveling of the state’s Medicaid program at the turn of the century could not 
be re-framed as a positive opportunity for growth and innovation. This was despite many 
empirical advantages: higher rates of insurance would improve poor health outcomes, expansion 
would not incur new state spending, and Tennessee legislators would be able to use other states’ 
best practices for expansion.    
 Finally, in Arizona, the only case where both the House and Senate approved expansion, 
Medicaid expansion was strategically bundled with the state budget to optimize expansion. 
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Framing may have allowed the subset of Republicans who voted in favor of the budget to escape 
from voter scrutiny. But it is more plausible that the political consequences of stalling on the 
budget were greater than the cost of expanding Medicaid.  
 Although framing appears to have unsuccessfully convinced its intended audience—
Republican voters in Republican districts—framing still informed the public narrative and 
political strategy. Framing still matters without outcomes changing, as is the case in Ohio, 
Tennessee, and Arizona. These cases show that politicians on all sides of the issue devote a lot of 
thought to framing expansion. Also, it is possible that framing succeeded even when expansion 
failed. In other words, Americans for Prosperity (AFP) in Tennessee successfully linked 
expansion with President Obama, contributing to expansion’s failure in the legislature. That 
frame—associating Medicaid expansion with the unpopular president—helped produce the 
group’s desired policy outcome. As these case studies revealed, governors were not alone in 
seeking to persuade Republican voters in Republican districts through frames. Framing did not 
necessarily fail in Tennessee just because expansion failed; rather, it appears that interest groups’ 
frames were more effective than the governor’s frames.  
 
The Future of Medicaid Expansion Framing 
 Existing literature suggests that the durability of laws depends on the environment in 
which they were first ratified. Policymaking is altered by many factors: administration, national 
or international events, proximity to election year. 290 Those conditions influence the likelihood 
of downstream policy amendments. Thus, we would expect politicians to point to the 
circumstances that led to positive policy outcomes when subsequent reforms or amendments are 	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proposed. Particular political conditions can make framing more or less important for 
determining political outcomes. 
 Here I explore how framing interacts with the dynamic policymaking process at the state 
level. Although Medicaid expansion will be credited to the governors who oversaw its legislative 
approval, policies evolve over time, and particularly, across gubernatorial administrations. 
Similarly, the role of framing evolves as leadership changes. Framing depends on whether a 
politician is introducing a policy or undoing a policy.  
 Framing thus remains relevant, as many seek to undo Medicaid expansion. Governors 
must bear in mind which frames were used to successfully pass Medicaid expansion and then 
design new appeals for a changed audience in order to reverse course. Once an expansion bill is 
passed, what frames must be used to undo the bill or chip away at portions of the bill? Part of the 
answer lies in Paul Pierson’s work on welfare state retrenchment. By retrenchment, he means, 
“cut[ting] social expenditure, restructur[ing] welfare state programs to conform more closely to 
the residual welfare state model, or alter[ing] the political environment in ways that enhance the 
probability of such outcomes in the future.” Pierson argues that the political forces explaining 
policy establishment differ from those explaining its retrenchment. 291 Can welfare policies 
survive today’s period of fiscal austerity, which is a common prescription for America’s current 
economic and political climate? 
 In order to successfully eliminate redistributive policies, like Medicaid expansion, 
governors must minimize the costs associated with cutting social spending. To do so, Pierson 
asserts that elected officials obfuscate, limiting the traceability of policy change. This protects 
their electability and reputation within the party for supporting the overall party mission. Also, 	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diffusing costs over time rather than introducing them all at once to a concentrated population 
minimizes political mobilization against those outcomes. Finally, politicians are often 
incentivized to make policy changes complex—hindering the media’s ability to convey changes 
to the public, and thereby paralyzing public protests.292 
 These strategies are obviously relevant to framing’s role in Medicaid expansion. The 
heavy lifting is not over once the legislature votes on expansion. Even if expansion is successful, 
elections, economic crises, or shifting political agendas can alter the environment in which 
expansion was endorsed and provide the conditions for a policy reversal. 
  Policy retrenchments have come to fruition in a handful of states that expanded 
Medicaid. As discussed earlier, elections have the power to change the political conditions under 
which expansion is considered and embraced. In Arizona, the November 2014 gubernatorial 
election altered the future prospects of a successful Medicaid expansion. Brewer’s successor, 
Republican Doug Ducey, proposed a number of limits to Medicaid expansion upon assuming 
office. However, he has not yet entirely dismantled the program. Why would Arizonians, who 
had just supported a pro-expansion governor, soon elect a staunchly anti-expansion governor? 
There is no clear answer.  
 If he successfully cuts Medicaid expansion, Ducey would be undoing a high-profile 
program that was recently implemented. Ducey framed his Medicaid cutbacks as promoting 
individual responsibility by discouraging reliance on government services while simultaneously 
protecting the most vulnerable populations who needed health insurance.293 Whittling down 
eligibility will be more difficult now since expansion has already passed than it would have been 
to prevent expansion from happening in the first place. Compared to other long-standing 	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democracies, the U.S. has a particularly arduous environment for reversing policies because 
there are an unusually high number of veto players. Thus, changing the policy status quo is a 
challenge.294  Critics of Ducey’s reform suggest he is implementing a program to “blame the 
poor and make sure there’s no way…to get out of poverty.”295 Ducey and his health policy team 
insist that their expansion alterations promote more fiscally sound behaviors surrounding health 
insurance.  The Ducey administration will have to create their own set of frames to garner 
support for expansion cuts. Another challenge specific to retrenchment as it relates to Medicaid 
expansion is that it appears that expansion policy produced tangible benefits—more people with 
health insurance, lower uncompensated care costs for hospitals, fewer emergency room visits—
undoing expansion must overcome the seemingly persuasive humanitarian frame.  
 The events that have transpired in Arizona since Ducey’s election demonstrate that the 
frames employed to retrench expansion are defensive and reflect the potential for harm or loss.  
In contrast, frames needed to implement a policy tend to emphasize the benefits of expansion for 
the state and the individual. While Governors Brewer, Kasich, and Haslam tried to rally support 
from Republican voters in Republican districts, post-expansion governors must frame expansion 
retrenchment to appeal to the General Assembly. These framing appeals are different from the 
counter-arguments that Brewer, Haslam, and Kasich contended with as they pursued expansion. 
Arguing that the federal government funding might not pan out after 2020 is not a counter-frame. 
Rather, it weakens the primary frame that expansion takes advantage of free federal money. This 
distinction is important because frames subtly change how voters think about budgets or social 
welfare.  
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 Elections changed the conditions for Medicaid expansion in Kentucky as well. 
Republican governor Matt Bevin pledged to reverse the “unsustainable” and “unaffordable” 
Medicaid expansion in his 2015 campaign.296 Bevin’s predecessor, Democrat Steve Beshear, 
enacted expansion via executive order.297 Despite Kentucky’s new identity as the prototypical 
ACA success story—expansion contributed to a 10% drop in uninsured individuals within just 
one year—Bevin was still elected by a nine point margin.298 
 Angel Strong, an unemployed nurse from Jackson County, Kentucky, where 34% of the 
population lives below the poverty line, is on Medicaid. She voted for anti-Medicaid Bevin 
because of his positions against abortion and same-sex marriage. As told to a reporter, “My 
religious beliefs outweigh whether or not I have insurance.”299 Perhaps the surprising victory of 
anti-expansion candidates in Arizona and Kentucky can be attributed to the fact that American 
voters do not vote based on candidates’ positions on health issues.300 Instead, Achen and Bartels 
assert, voters adjust their own policy views based on candidates’ social identities rather than 
candidates’ policy preferences. 
 Given the challenge of retrenchment and the evolving nature of state politics, 
successfully framing Medicaid requires the perfect storm. Although framing may not predict 
policy outcomes, it still matters for public understanding of policy and the vitality of policy after 
its initial implementation. In Ohio, Tennessee, and Arizona, voter support for expansion as 
indicated in polls was not significant enough to sway legislators who seemed more accountable 
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to partisan and ideological expectations. Even when the expansion debate was shifted to issues of 
morality or fiscal necessity, governors were all but required to employ unusual and extraordinary 
means to implement Medicaid expansion.  
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
 
 “…and we have now just enshrined, as soon as I sign this bill, the core principle that 
everybody should have some basic security when it comes to their health care.” 
    —President Barack Obama, March 23, 2010 
 
 Six years have passed since President Obama suggested that America should consider 
healthcare as a right for its citizens. Not only is the ACA’s success unclear, but crucial parts of 
the policy have yet to be implemented to their full potential. Obama’s intentions in 2010 have 
been dashed in part by state irresolution. The politics of Medicaid expansion are not over. States 
that have not yet expanded can still opt to do so, while states that have expanded Medicaid can 
undo or curtail the program.  Medicaid expansion in conservative environments is not only about 
who controls the General Assembly or the governorship. Expansion politics are national, 
regional, local, and individual.  
 Medicaid expansion produced complex state politics, as evidenced by the above case 
studies and discussion of framing. Aside from the question of whether framing contributes to 
positive expansion outcomes, an important lesson from this research is that people in power—
political elites—think that framing matters. Governors, and politicians generally, spend 
substantial resources devising strategic messages based on public opinion polls and focus group 
feedback. These efforts are based on the premise that framing can produce different outcomes, 
but the accuracy of this belief is unclear. Political psychology scholarship posits that individuals 
are vulnerable to frames because they are uninformed and subject to politicians’ suspect 
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motivations. But my research shows that elite manipulation does not change public preferences 
in a way that modifies policy outcomes. Framing may alter polling data, but the translation of 
that effect to actual public policy outcomes is shaky at best. My research demonstrates that the 
supposed risks of elite framing are not so alarming because elite frames interact with a multitude 
of messaging sources and do not alone produce unexpected policy results. Governors were not 
alone in seeking to persuade Republican voters in Republican districts through frames. Just as 
the federalists had their anti-federalists, pro-expansion governors had anti-expansion foes—and 
there were many of them. Thomas Nelson and Donald Kinder describe framing as a contest; the 
governor is just one participant in the frame game.301  Future research might focus less on 
framers only as proponents of Medicaid expansion, and instead consider Nelson and Kinder’s 
observation and look at the more difficult idea of framing as a competition. If in fact framing is a 
multi-player contest, concerns that the future of democracy is in peril because of elite framing 
are overreaching.  
 Nonetheless, framing does have a certain power in politics. An additional hurdle for 
future Medicaid frames will be the shifting demographics of the program. As a means-tested 
welfare program, Medicaid is often seen as a redistributive government handout for minorities 
and poor women and children, although whites are more likely than blacks to receive welfare 
overall. A redistributive welfare policy for non-whites is not a strong selling point for American 
public policy. But as the entire premise of healthcare is shifting post-ACA, Medicaid will 
encompass more than just the poorest of the poor, changing the demographics of beneficiaries 
and the images associated with the program. Increasing the income threshold to 138% FPL 
means that in addition to the poorest individuals who already qualify for Medicaid, more “just-	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poor” and poor Americans will enroll in the program. In the vast majority of states, this 
population will include minority populations as well as whites. This shift has the potential to 
complicate conventional, racially charged characterizations of Medicaid. Beyond the scope of 
the American healthcare landscape, framing strategies for welfare and other social issues reveal 
demographic and ideological trends of Americans. As the effects of the ACA and its subparts 
fully flesh out, frames that contributed the implementation of these policies will become 
increasingly relevant as policies are revised under new administrations and especially as 
Americans become more accustomed to having health insurance.  
 
 
 
 
 
